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Cyber crime is an increasingly prominent threat to all aspects of society including
businesses, government, banks, transportation, and individuals. The security of computer
networks is dependent on the ability to recognize and defend against malicious cyber attacks.
The goal of this thesis is to utilize operation research techniques to create tools that will
significantly contribute to cyber security. A simulation framework and template is developed to
efficiently represent computer networks and cyber security intrusion detection systems. The
simulation is capable of generating complex cyber attacks based on the computer network
configuration and the capabilities of the attacker. The simulation results in alert messages
corresponding to attack actions and ordinary network behavior which are typically used by
situational awareness tools or systems administrators to identify and take action against the
attack. Through verification, validation, and an experimental performance evaluation, the
simulation model is shown to be an effective tool to enable testing of situational awareness tools
and for determining network vulnerabilities. In addition, this thesis extends the highly effective
information fusion methods of situational awareness and threat assessment by introducing a
method of adaptive process refinement for cyber security. The adaptive process refinement
model utilizes integer programming optimization to improve the success of cyber attack
detection, tracking, and identification. The process refinement model is designed to dynamically
provide recommendations for optimal allocation of network detection resources subject to
processing capacity, current attack activity, and network vulnerabilities. The cyber attack
simulation methodology is utilized to create a set of attack scenarios on computer networks that
are used conduct an experimental performance evaluation of the adaptive process refinement
model to determine its capabilities and limitations. The simulation and process refinement
methods provide operations research tools that will help to advance the field of cyber security.
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1. Introduction
The development of computer networks and the use of the Internet have grown rapidly
since their early use some forty years ago. In that time span, both the size and complexity of
operations in computer networks have grown enormously. Many administrators are finding
themselves hard pressed for simple cyber security solutions. In addition, more and more
organizations and individuals are using networks to store and transfer sensitive data such as
social security numbers, credit card information, company secrets, and even government
classified information. As a result, crimes such as thievery and sabotage have shifted from the
physical domain to the cyber domain. Today's bank robbers and terrorists do not always operate
in the open, but often from a computer terminal, stealing money and personal information, or
corrupting and exploiting confidential data. In large networks, the attacks or thefts may not be
realized until the hacker is long gone. Crime has become easier to commit and harder to detect
(Furnell, 2003).
Security measures are being developed to help counteract this cyber crime paradigm.
Companies use tools such as firewalls, router filters, access control lists, and network
management protocols to limit access and transmissions of malicious packets (Cisco Systems,
2003). These tools are designed to prevent unauthorized users from gaining access to the
network and block potentially harmful files from entering the network. Unfortunately, even with
these security methods, intrusions still occur and other methods of security are needed
(Kemmerer & Vigna, 2002).
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is used in many cases to detect malicious attacks that
penetrate other security tools in place. In the ever-changing environment of computer
technology, attackers identify vulnerabilities in the large range of existing computer systems
faster than systems administrators can fix them (Bandy, Money & Worstell, 2002). As a result,
the IDS is often used as a last line of defense for a network. Rather than preventing access and
transmission of data, intrusion detection systems are used to identify unusual or prohibited
actions that occur in the network and report the actions in some way, often in the form of an
alert. One of the duties of an analyst is to parse through the IDS alerts and identify where they
feel an attackmay be occurring.
Systems administrators performed early intrusion detection in a manual way.
Administrators would examine network traffic and look for anomalous activity. As network
sizes grew, this became labor intensive and administrators started using audit logs, which are a
list of all actions a computer has performed, for their analysis. Unfortunately, this could only be
used as a forensic tool to determine the causes of past security incidents. Later, programs were
developed that could analyze the audit logs but they were not fast enough to detect security
breaches in time to prevent the consequences (Kemmerer & Vigna, 2002).
In the early 1 990s, the first intrusion detection systems to analyze network traffic in real
time were developed. At this point, some attacks could be stopped before they reached a goal
and some attacks could be prevented before an intrusion occurred. However, as networks
continued to grow, intrusion detection systems were required for use in large networks. The
detection capability requirements also grew with the enormous number of vulnerabilities in
systems being found. Current intrusion detection system development focuses on deployment in
large networks and increased detection capability (Kemmerer & Vigna, 2002).
Today, intrusion detection systems are used in many large companies as part of their
security policy. However, due to the complexity of modern networks, intrusion detection
systems have become extremely complicated and often difficult to manage. Many larger
networks could experience hundreds of thousands of alerts each day, with the rate increasing if
the network contained information that would be especially valuable to hackers (Sudit, Stotz &
Holender, 2005). As a result, the complexity of analyzing all of the alerts produced has
increased significantly, and techniques are needed to assist in the interpretation of the alerts.
One technique used for analyzing large amounts of data from multiple sources is called
information fusion. Information fusion is a closed-loop process for analyzing data from one or
many sources and creating relevant and useful information, which an analyst can use to make
decisions. Fusion operates at five different levels: Level 0 - Sub-Object Data Association and
Estimation; Level 1 - Object Refinement; Level 2 - Situation Refinement; Level 3 - Impact
Assessment; and Level 4 - Process Refinement (Llinas, 2002). Each level is discussed in detail
in section three.
Many Industrial Engineering techniques can be used in the fusion process to provide
solutions to information fusion problems at various levels. Specifically, operations research and
simulation have applications in this area (Bistarelli, Foley & O'Sullivan, 2004; Sudit, Stotz, &
Holender, 2005; Kuhl & Kistner, 2005). This thesis focuses on using simulation to create
multistage cyber attacks on a simulated network and using mathematical programming to
optimize the processing of information by a cyber security information fusion system.
2. Problem Statement
The goal of this thesis project will be twofold. First, to develop a simulation
methodology for modeling multistage cyber attacks which can have various uses in the cyber
domain, including testing of new cyber security assistance tools. Second, to create a system that
can refine and improve the way in which data is analyzed, so that an analyst is presented with the
most relevant information for the current situation.
The first goal stems from the need to test and evaluate cyber security tools in a realistic
computer network environment. Traditionally, physical computer networks have been used to
perform and record cyber attack scenarios. Although realistic, these exercises involve high costs
resulting from setting up the physical network (and reconfiguring the network for each scenario),
experts needed to run the attacks, potential loss due to damage resulting from attack actions
(such as viruses), and long setup and execution times.
Therefore, this research investigates the development of a cyber attack simulation model
to accurately and efficiently simulate cyber attacks in a computer network. The simulation
methodology can provide a flexible environment for constructing a computer network and
efficiently specifying and generating cyber attacks.
The information fusion process will be the base methodology for the second goal of this
thesis. Fusion involves correlating data at different levels to structurally analyze the data and
provide better understanding ofwhat the data means. Fusing the data provided by IDSs provides
a situational awareness for the analyst that can tell them what is currently happening in the
network. The fusion process can also provide an assessment of the potential impact or threat of
the current activities that are occurring in the network. Finally, the process will also give advice
to the analyst on how they should refine the detection process which is called Process
Refinement. Process Refinement is the area that will be investigated to help improve the data
analysis that an analyst must perform.
The problem of analyzing all of the intrusion alerts has been investigated by many
different sources, such as: Sudit, Stotz, & Holender, (2005); Mathew et al., (2005); Undercoffer
& Pinkston, (2002); Bass, (2000). In general, the analysis is done through correlation.
Researchers have developed systems that correlate the alerts of the intrusion detection systems
through a variety of correlation criteria. Information fusion is a structured method, which may
provide more straightforward results than other systems.
Process refinement is relatively new to the cyber domain, though extensive work has
been done in other areas (Musick & Malhotra, 1994 and Malhotra, 1995). Process refinement
involves altering the real-world sensing environment in different ways so that the other levels of
fusion can provide better information or altering the fusion process itself to improve the way in
which data is processed. Unlike other levels of fusion, the refinement process is concerned with
all other levels rather than just the level before or after, so that the system as a whole can
increase performance (Llinas, 2002). Also unlike the other levels, process refinement provides a
recommendation to the analyst on how to change the real world environment (Malhotra, 1995).
All other levels deal only with informing the analyst of the situation or status.
In the cyber domain, process refinement does not necessarily mean the relocation of
sensors. The "costs" of sensing in the cyber domain are minimal in many cases due to open
source software availability and high-speed networking. Process refinement also does not
necessarily mean changing the sensor itself. With today's computing technology, collecting
larger quantities of data in the form of alerts is not necessarily the problem. Rather, the problem
is processing the information that will help to identify and potentially stop an attack before too
great of a loss is incurred. The fact is that although IDS's may produce large numbers of alerts,
in most cases a relatively small number of the alerts correspond to malicious attacks.
Consequently, selectively processing the alerts that have the best potential of identifying the
presence and progress of an attack, would allow for near real-time decision-making.
Therefore, the focus of this research is to create a system that can identify what specific
IDS information to process, as well as when and how to process the information. The system
could be used to provide more accurate results faster in the other levels of fusion. Rather than
managing sensors themselves as suggested in Musick & Malhotra, 1994 and Malhotra, 1995,
managing and refining the fusion process as a whole is necessary in the cyber domain.
The objectives of the simulation methodology and the process refinement system include:
1) Developing an initial simulation methodology to model multistage cyber attacks. The
simulation methodology should include an automatic attack generation methodology.
Using the automatic attack generation methodology, the simulation could run under a
variety of conditions with minimal setup required.
2) Creating a method for simulating a computer network involving machines and switches.
The machines and switches should contain attributes which can be used to make them
unique. This will allow formore specific modeling and will provide more realistic attack
scenarios.
3) Verifying and validating the attack simulation methodology. The methodology should be
validated to ensure that the data being generated truly reflects the cyber attack
environment.
4) Obtaining the most useful information given the processing capacity of the resources. By
doing this, the system will be able to optimize the number of alerts that need to be
processed to obtain the best information about the situation.
5) Having the capability to capture new information and analyze information in real-time as
events occur. When a new attack or attack step occurs, the process refinement system
should suggest ways in which to reallocate resources to the new problem area. The
system should make optimal choices between existing problems involving where to
allocate resources.
6) Measuring the effect or benefit of any suggested refinements. In particular, metrics will
be created to measure the benefit of using Process Refinement over static detection
scenarios.
Process refinement is an area of fusion, which has not yet been integrated in the cyber
domain. By constantly refining and updating the fusion system, the system can keep pace with
the evolving vulnerabilities and actions that hackers can take as attacks progress. By allowing
the system to pull from more accurate and more relevant data sources, the fusion system will be
able to provide better information to the analyst. Ultimately, the fusion system is designed to
provide the analyst with the most relevant data based on the current situation and provide the
analyst with a good picture of what is wrong with the network. A direct result of this process
may also be a reduced amount of information that the analyst must view. By constantly refining
this process, the analyst will receive more pertinent and useful information.
3. Literature Review
Related work to process refinement and attack simulation in the cyber domain is very prevalent
in some aspects but not in others. The following topics will be discussed: Modeling and
simulation of computer networks, modeling and simulation of hacker attacks, detecting and
identifying attacks on a network, and information fusion and applications in the cyber domain.
3.1 Modeling andSimulation ofComputerNetworks
Modeling of computer networks can take a variety of forms. Models involving graphs
and graph-based algorithms have been developed to analyze computer networks. Rule based
programs and systems have also been developed to test or simulate different parts of computer
networks. These applications are not only used to test the security ofcomputer networks but also
for more traditional model analysis such as new technology feasibility, learning environments
and manymore.
Graph theory is an area of study in which groups of nodes and edges connected together
form a network, which could model many different entities, including a computer network or
even the Internet. As such, graph theory techniques have been used to evaluate computer
networks in many different ways. Specifically, graph theory problems, such as the shortest path
problem, have been integrated into computer networking to analyze a network. Solving the
shortest path problem for a computer network would show the analyst the shortest way to get
from a starting point to every other point in the network. This information could be used to
determine improvements to a network's security policy so that the hacker either has no path to
secret information or must take a very long route to get to the information, risking detection the
whole way. The shortest path problem is solved by Dijkstra's Algorithm, which is used in Fitch
& Hoffman, 1993 to evaluate a computer network.
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Simulation has been used to test and evaluate systems without interfering with the system
in situations such as manufacturing or service. Currently, researchers are attempting to do
similar types of analysis on computer networks. Since experimenting with attacks on a computer
network can often be harmful to the network, a new format of testing is required. Some analysts
evaluate their own network by creating test bed systems that are not connected to the network,
but this requires both hardware and knowledgeable testers. Others have used simulation to test
their network by building a virtual network and simulating hacker attacks (Zaliwski, 2005).
With this method, no hardware is needed except for the machine running the simulation, and
there is no risk of permanent damage. However, for the simulation results to be accurate, an
extensively detailed model must be created (Kuhl & Kistner, 2005).
In addition, simulated computer network environments can be used to teach
administrators about new attacks and how to mitigate the consequences of those attacks
(Zaliwski, 2005). This method of learning about hacker attacks and their consequences can also
be integrated into the redesign of security tools and the development of new ones, such as
intrusion tolerant systems architecture (Research Triangle Institute, 2005). Intrusion tolerant
systems architecture involves adapting to new attacks as they arrive using a fault tolerant based
methodology applying to existing and dynamic faults.
In general, security based computer network modeling and simulation is used to find
problems or issues with a computer network without consideration of a particular type of attack.
By examining the network and finding different exploitable or vulnerable points, an analyst can
try to patch those areas. The problem with this method is that it exists in a reactive mode.
Hackers, rather than administrators, more often find new vulnerabilities at an ever-increasing rate
(McClure, Scambray & Kurtz, 2001). As a result, an administrator using these types of reactive
tools may not be able to keep up with the increasing complexity and ingenuity of the modern
hacker.
3.2Modeling and Simulation ofHackerAttacks
Modeling and simulation of hacker attacks builds upon modeling and simulating of
computer networks in that researchers wish to model and simulate how different hacker attacks
can move through the network. Some researchers are concerned with the speed of an attack and
how easily the attack spreads (Symantec, 2005) while other researchers are more concerned with
how to adjust the security policy to prevent particular attacks (Seo & Cho, 2003). As with the
previous topic, the analysts are attempting to figure out ways in which the network is vulnerable.
In this area, they are simulating attacks and in some cases, coordinated sets of attacks, to
determine the resulting impact on the network.
The main objective in most simulations of hacker attacks is to test a particular security
policy framework against a variety of common attacks to determine ways in which the security
policy fails. By creating various types of attacks, analysts can determine which attacks would be
successful and which would fail by running simulations of those attacks on a simulated network.
Once successful attacks are identified, the analysts can adjust firewalls, IDS and other policy
components to attempt to prevent them. The simulation can then be repeated under the adjusted
network to test the results of the change (Korea Information SecurityAgency, 2005).
Models have also been developed to identify which parts of a network are vulnerable to
types of attacks. This method, which is like preemptive attack determination, can take many
forms. For example, Shyner, Haines, Jha, Lippman and Wing (2002) create "attack
graphs"
based on some type of hacker goal such as retrieve information x from machine y. The system
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builds a graph, which identifies ways in which a hacker might achieve the goal that was input.
An example of an attack graph is shown in Figure 1.
M IS
Figure 1 - Attack Graph
Attack simulations can also be used to generate many different types of data depending
on what the application calls for. The data generated could be of immediate use in improving the
security of a network, or could be used in testing another system. In a methodology created by
Kuhl and Kistner (2005), the attack simulation is used to generate sample intrusion detection
system output, which can be used in testing other systems. The simulation model development
of this thesis builds offof the work ofKuhl and Kistner.
A comprehensive use of simulation for improving security of networks and training of
administrators is presented in the RINSE methodology (Liljenstam, Liu, Nicol, Yuan, Yan &
Grier, 2005). The RINSE methodology uses a simulation environment in a type of gaming
environment in which a "game manager" can run attacks on target machines and the "players"
can diagnose what attacks are occurring, use different security measures to block the attacks and
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interact with the target machines to adjust their properties. This allows a user to learn about the
type of attacks that hackers use today and can provide a framework for testing attack mitigation
for newly developed attacks. The RINSE framework diagram is shown in Figure 2. This area of



















Figure 2 - RINSE Framework
Simulations can also be useful in identifying ways to eliminate the attacks before they
can occur. A major draw back of these methodologies, however, is that in large networks the
analysis ofdifferent attacks can rapidly grow complex. Also, it is time-consuming and tedious to
analyze every different combination ofattack.
3.3Detecting and IdentifyingAttacks on a Network
The research that involves detecting attacks on networks can be split into two different
sections based on when the detection occurs. The most common is real-time attack detection
using intrusion detection systems or other types of logging systems. Also, a process that is
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becoming obsolete with new technology is the forensic analysis of logs to determine when and
how an attack occurred.
Most real-time detection systems integrate with intrusion detection systems. The idea
behind these systems is to correlate the alerts that seem to go together based on some alert
attributes. By correlating many alerts together, the system can create a string, which may
represent a hacker's progression through a network (Sudit, Stotz & Holender, 2005).
The use of logs and network traffic data as a forensic tool has started to become obsolete
with, the newest technology. IDSs are becoming faster and easier to update, in addition to
becoming open source so everyone can afford them. As a result, forensic analysis is not often
used except for identifying unknown successful attacks (Kemmerer & Vigna, 2002).
The research involving identifying attacks is an extremely important one because it can
allow an administrator to block progressive or future attacks stemming from an original that has
been identified. Identifying attacks on networks involves detecting the attack and piecing
together information to determine what the attack is trying to accomplish. This can be achieved
by a single IDS alert or through complex analysis ofmultiple information sources.
The types of attack paths that can occur in a computer network have also been studied by
many different groups. Neumann and Parker (1989) classify attacks in terms of technique. This
indicates the type of damage caused or actions that the hacker is trying to take. Lindqvist and
Johnson (1997) expand on this formula, with classification by more than one category.
Categories suggested are intrusion technique, intrusion result and others. Further research has
been conducted to identify what makes an event, attack or incident and what features each may
have (Howard & Longstaff, 1998). These features include possible attackers, attack tools,
vulnerabilities, results and objectives. Other research has focused on classifying cyber attacks by
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focusing on the target of the attack (Undercoffer & Pinkston, 2002). Mathew, Britt, Giomundo,
Upadhyaya, Sudit and Stotz (2005) suggest a method for understanding multi-stage attacks and
how to relate individual attacks to their role in reconnaissance, intrusion, escalation of privilege
and goal in a large cyber attack. In their work, Mathew et al. create a framework in which nodes
corresponding to scenario graphs are activated based on intrusion information provided by IDS.
The scenario graph builds and nodes connect together as further attack steps are instantiated and
detected by the IDS.
Yang and Holsopple (2005) discuss a framework for analyzing the threat of cyber attacks
in a dynamic manner. Threat is analyzed by examining three attributes of an attack: capability,
opportunity and intent. Capability refers to the hacker's ability to execute different actions
against a network. Opportunity is based on what the hacker can do next. This is determined by
the vulnerabilities of the network, the information that the hacker has already gained and the
topology of the network. Intent is what the hacker intends to accomplish with an action or series
of actions. The authors suggest that this is very difficult to achieve in the cyber domain.
Examining the attack path already traveled by the hacker is suggested as a way to determine the
hacker's intent.
3.4 Information Fusion andApplications in the CyberDomain
The study of multi-source information fusion began with military applications in which
accurate and relevant information was required about attributes of an opposing force, such as
location, strength, movement direction, etc. At the time, using one sensor was simply not
enough to detect all of these different attributes. A system was required to integrate the
information from many different sensors to provide an analyst with a good view of the overall
situation, or what is known as situational awareness.
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As a result of this need, the first models of the information fusion process were born.
There are five levels in the information fusion process as identified by the JDL (Joint Directors
of Laboratories) Fusion Model, each level further refining the data presented by different sensors
until an overall awareness of the situation can be presented (Linas, Bowman, Rogova, Steinberg,
Waltz & White, 2004). For simplicity, Level 0 will not be included in this discussion because it

































Level 0 - Sub-object Data Association & Estimation:
pixel/signal level data association and characterization
Level 1 - Object Refinement:
observation-to-track association, continuous state estimation (e.g.
kinematics), and discrete state estimation (e.g. target type and ID) and
prediction
Level 2 Situation Refinement:
object clustering and relational analysis, to include force structure and
cross force relations, communications, physical context, etc.
Level 3 - Impact Assessment (Threat Refinement, Threat Intent Estimation.
Event Prediction):
consequence prediction, susceptibility and vulnerability assessment
Figure 3 - JDL Information Fusion Model
At Level 1, object refinement, techniques such as correlation, statistical estimation and
pattern recognition are used to identify what different sensors are detecting similarities and
differences in. The most common method used in the cyber domain is correlation (Sudit, Stotz
& Holender, 2005, Bass, 2000, and Julisch, 2003). Correlation may involve aligning all
observations in the same frame of reference (time, space, etc) and assigning weighted metrics.
In Level 2, situation refinement, statistical techniques or knowledge-based models are
used. Situation refinement involves aggregating sets of alerts based on a variety of
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characteristics. Alerts produced by intrusion detection systems are aggregated based on a
number of factors such as source and target IP address, protocol, time, etc (Bass, 2000).
Level 3, impact assessment, attempts to estimate the result or impact of potential
situations that levels one and two have defined. This level is also known as threat assessment.
Threat assessment and impact assessment are technically the same level of fusion but threat
assessment tries to predict not only the impact of the current situation but also what an attacker
might try to do next. Techniques of level three analyses include Bayesian networks and Markov
models as well as many others. Threat assessment in the cyber domain incorporates impact
analysis of current hacker attacks. Yang and Holsopple (2005) also present research
investigating threat assessment in the cyber domain that involves using an information graph to
determine what information a hacker can obtain using the information they currently have.
Level 4, process refinement, deals with the management of the sensors and the
management of the fusion process itself. This area has been researched and defined in many
military applications such as aviation sensing (Musick & Malhotra, 1994 and Malhotra, 1995).
However, to date no research has been conducted in the area of process refinement in the cyber
domain.
3.5 Summary
Modeling and simulation methodologies are used in many different applications of
security analysis. However, the general framework of network simulation, although it may be
designed differently for different systems, operates in very similar ways. The attributes of the
network that are modeled are very similar, as is the way that entities might operate within the
network. The main difference is the level of detail in which the network is simulated. Some
simulation models use very detailed attributes of the network (Kotenko, 2003) while others use
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only the main attributes such as topology and IP address (Kuhl & Kistner, 2005). The level of
detail required depends on the application. However, any framework, no matter how detailed,
can be used to produce a variety of different results including recommendations for
improvement, training, and data generation.
Information fusion is a process that is still relatively new to the cyber domain and as
such, has not been fully developed. Applications of levels one and two processes have been
developed, however, work in the area of level three is just beginning. Level four processes such
as sensor location have been analyzed (Graham, 2005 and Calabrese, 2002), but the refinement
of the fusion process has not been investigated. Due to the changing environment in which
systems administrators operate, any tool that assists an administrator must be as dynamic as the
environment. A fusion process without process refinement will not be able to adapt to a
changing environment and will not last long in the dynamic cyber domain.
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4. Development of Simulation Methodology
The cyber attack simulation methodology can assist in training administrators and testing
cyber security assistance tools such as cyber security information fusion systems. The
methodology should be capable of modeling a variety of cyber attacks on a customizable
simulated network. The methodology should incorporate a method for generating attacks
quickly and with minimal user bias. The simulated network should contain attribute detail of the
machines and switches contained in the network. Finally, the model should be validated to
ensure that outputs of the methodology reflect real output in the cyber domain.
An initial simulation model was created for the Air Force Research Lab in Rome, NY
(Kuhl & Kistner, 2005). The Air Force required a simulation methodology to model multistage,
coordinated cyber attacks performed on a virtual network and the data that would be generated
by intrusion detection systems placed at different locations in the virtual network. This model
provides the basis for the development of the overall cyber attack simulation methodology.
Improving the cyber attack simulation methodology will allow for better applications of
the simulation methodology in general and allow the simulation methodology to assist in the
testing of the process refinement system. Development of the simulation methodology involves
four main steps: creation of an initial multistage cyber attack simulation methodology,
formulation of a methodology for automatic attack generation, addition of further machine
attributes to current network modeling template, and verification and validation of the updated
methodology.
4.1 Original Simulation Model
This section describes the original simulation model built to model multistage cyber
attacks. The simulation was created in the Arena simulation package produced by Rockwell
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Software. The model consisted of five main pieces: creation of virtual network, attack flow
through the network, attack specification, noise generation and alert production.
4.1.1 Creation ofVirtual Network
To create a virtual network, inclusion ofmachines, which process data on a network, and
switches that route data through a network, was necessary. In order for the simulation model to
be robust, it was necessary to allow dynamic creation of virtual networks. This meant that
network topology and information had to be created by the user rather than incorporated into the
simulation logic.
The Arena software uses templates to provide standard modeling techniques to model
developers. A new template had to be created for the purpose of building a computer network.
The template created provided the user with a means of building the network topology and
specifying the network information through a graphical means. By dragging and dropping the
icons into the model development window, the user could quickly build the network. Each icon
created needed to have some information detailed about it such as the IP address for machines
and the addition of an IDS sensor for the switches. Another critical piece of information that the
user must specify is whether a machine is internal or external. This determines whether the
machine is accessible from the Internet. If the machine is accessible from the Internet, then it
can be a starting point for an external threat attack. The template that was created and the
information required of each instance ofa template icon can be found in Appendix E.
4. 1.2 AttackFlow Through theNetwork
Modeling the attack flow through the network is where most of the simulation logic was
required. It was necessary to model the movement of each attack through the computer network.
Attacks could possibly occur at the same time, sequentially or in any other way based on the user
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input. The attacks would progress through the simulation logic, looping back to the beginning if
there are multiple steps to the attack. The attacks may also loop if they are unsuccessful. A
diagram of the entity flow can be found in Appendix E.
Entities which represent attacks are first created by a create block and then assigned a
unique attack number at the corresponding assign block. The VBA block samples some attack
attributes based on the way each attack was setup by the user. The next assign block gives the
attack entity the attributes for the first step of its attack. One of the attributes assigned is the
target IP address that is used in the FindJ block. The FindJ block finds the station associated
with the target IP address and then the station number is assigned as an attribute. The entity is
then delayed for a period of time corresponding to user input and then routed to the station that it
was assigned.
The entity then travels into another sub-model of simulation logic. This is the main
attack routing area in which the steps of the attack are executed and any repetition of a step due
to step failure is made. The entities start at the station block and are transported to a branch
block. The branch block will send copies of the entity to another area for processing of alerts.
The area that the entity travels to next is another branch block. This branch block determines if
the attack step was successful. Success or failure is determined by comparing the success
probability specified by the user to a random sample from a uniform(0,l) distribution. If it was
successful it will travel to another piece of logic to be assigned a new attack step, step attributes
and routed to another station much like it did when it was created. If the step fails, the entity will
not be assigned a new attack step but will follow the same path as successful entities. However,
since it has not been assigned a new attack step, the attributes assigned will be the same as the
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previous iteration. The entity will then be routed back to the same station and repeat the process
which it just went through. The entity will continue doing this until successful.
The VBA block in the last line of the logic specifies the next step information. This VBA
block samples from the user input to determine the next target and the type of attack to perform.
The FindJ, Assign, Delay and Route blocks work the same as they did when the entity was
created. When an entity reaches the last step of its attack and is successful, it is routed to a final
assign block to indicate the attack completion and then disposed.
4.1.3 Attack Specification
Attacks can be specified using a graphical user interface or through an input file. The
input file could be created by any means but for each attack scenario created with the GUI, an
input file is generated. This allows the user to run an attack scenario multiple times without
needed to input the information multiple times. The GUI was designed in Visual Basic which is
the support language incorporated into the Arena software.
Using the interface, the user specifies a unique name for the attack scenario, as well as some
other general scenario information. This includes the distribution for sampling of delay times,
the method in which to specify delays (specific or sample over an interval), the time to run the
simulation after the last attack has been completed as well as some information about the noise
(this will be covered in the next section). The user can then specify up to ten different attacks
with up to 30 steps in each attack.
When specifying an attack, the user must first give the attack a unique name and input the
number of steps that the attack will contain. When the user sets the number of steps by pressing
the Reset Form button, the multi-page will adjust its number of tabs to allow the user to specify
information for each step. In each step, the user must specify the IP address from which the
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attack will originate and the IP address for the target machine. After specifying the source IP
address of the attack, the user can click the Update Target IP button to update the list of IP
addresses, which can be reached by the source IP address based on the network topology. Next
the user can specify the success probability of the step and whether they want the information in
the step to be encoded. Many hackers will encode their information to attempt to hide it from the
intrusion detection system. This problem is handled by a preprocessor system that evaluates
information packets not by the signature but by the format of the information (Snort, 2005). The
user then specifies the specific action that they want to perform. These actions are split into five
main categories, each category having subcategories as well. The categories and subcategories
are listed in the Literature Review. The user can specify a category, a subcategory or a specific
action. If a specific action is not chosen, an action will be sampled from the subcategory if one
was specified or from the general category. If no information is input for the action, an action
will be sampled at random from the entire population. The buttons located under the action input
boxes will update the information in consecutive boxes to give the user a refined list to choose
from. Lastly, the user can specify the specific delay time for each attack (if this was the method
chosen on the main screen) or the time interval over which the entire attack should take place.
The user also can specify the time to delay the start of the attack.
Clicking done will take the user back to the main screen and the attack that was just
created will appear in the list box. The user can then add another attack, edit any that are
currently in the list box and delete any attacks that are in the list box. Clicking the Run
Simulation button will start the simulation with the information input by the user. See Appendix
E for screen shots from the user interface.
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4.1.4 Noise Generation
The generation of noise was modeled independently of the generation of attacks. This
was done to reflect how attacks and noise information packets would interact in a real network.
The information about the noise is specified during attack scenario setup in the GUI. The user
can specify what types of noise they want to include and at what percentage of the total that the
different types arrive. The types of noise are based on the categories of attack actions as
mentioned in the Literature Review. The user also needs to specify the noise frequency that will
be used in the noise creation logic.
The logic for noise creation can be seen in Appendix E. At the start of the simulation,
one entity is created. Ifno noise frequency has been specified, the entity will be disposed and no
noise will be generated. If a frequency has been specified, the entity will enter a loop in which it
will be delayed for a time sampled from a Poisson distribution with a mean based on the noise
frequency. After the delay, the entity will enter a branch block to determine if it is time to stop
noise creation. This metric is based on all attacks being complete and the time to run after attack
completion specified by the user has been exceeded. If the two conditions for stopping noise
generation are met, the entity will be disposed. If noise generation should continue, the entity
will be routed to VBA blocks that are used to create the noise alert and write it to a file.
4.1.5 Alert Production
When attack entities are traveling through the main attack flow logic, they are at one
point, copied and routed to another set of simulation logic that is used to produce alerts in
different files. One set of logic represents alerts that correspond to actual attack events (no
noise). In the literature, this is called Ground Truth. Another set of logic represents the creation
of alerts by the IDS. The file created by this set of logic is meant to be representative of the files
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created by actual intrusion detection systems. As such, they contain alerts corresponding to
actual attacks mixed with alerts that are considered noise.
Each set of logic has a VBA block, which executes from code to create the alert. There
are currently two blocks in each set, one for the Snort IDS and one for the Dragon IDS. The
different systems require their own code because they have different formats. The branch
module creates entity copies so that each VBA block is reached. The dispose module removes
the entities after their processing is complete.
Each IDS that is setup in the virtual network will have a file associated with it. If an
attack is detected by the IDS based on its location then the alert will be produced in its file.
Noise alerts are distributed based on the location of the machine. If the machine is external,
there is a higher chance that it will experience some noise alerts than an internal machine.
Therefore, some files may contain many alerts while others, only a few. A file is created to
represent ground truth in a format familiar to the user and others are created to represent the
ground truth in alert format for each type of IDS. The files are displayed in the interface at the
end of the simulation run so they can be viewed, have their name changed or deleted.
4. 1.6Example Simulation Scenario
An example attack scenario is listed below and the network, files and data corresponding
to it are contained in Appendix F. The goal of this attack is to create a denial of service on a
machine on the internal network. Information is gathered about the external network, and then
the VPN server is penetrated. The server is then used as a stepping-stone to reach the target
machine.
The following are the steps of the attack:
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1) Enumeration on VPN server from outside of the network attempting to get user
passwords. Succeeded on first attempt. Step was encoded.
2) Intrusion at the user level on the VPN server from outside of network. Succeeded on first
attempt and attacker gained access to server. Step was encoded.
3) Backdoor left on the VPN server for future access if necessary. Succeeded on first
attempt. Step was encoded.
4) Reconnaissance on machine in subnet with snort sensor, specifically ICMP Ping from
VPN server. Succeeded on first attempt.
5) Intrusion at the user level on machine 100.10.20.1 from VPN server. Succeeded on first
attempt.
Denial of service enacted on 100.10.20.1 from VPN server. Succeeded on first attempt. Step
was encoded.
4.2 Formulation ofAutomaticAttack GenerationMethodology
Developing an automatic attack generation methodology was necessary to create multiple
attacks quickly an efficiently while ensure that user bias was minimized. The automatic attack
generation methodology is different from the manual attack generation methodology of the
original simulation model in that the user need only specify an ultimate goal on an ultimate target
machine, and a feasible attack path will be automatically generated. This improves the
capabilities of the cyber attack simulation methodology by making the generation of attacks
easier on the user. Attacks will be created quickly and with minimal input from the user. In
addition, because the attacks are generated randomly, there is no bias from the user involved in
the generation of the attacks.
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4.2. 1 Inputs to theAutomaticAttack GenerationMethodology
In order to automatically formulate feasible attack tracks to achieve an ultimate goal,
determining the actions feasible at different stages was necessary. The methodology uses a
graph-based template to determine which groups of actions are feasible at different stages of the
attack. This graph-based template for the structure of attacks can then be converted into an
adjacency matrix that can be used by the simulation model to evaluate what actions can occur
next based on what actions have already occurred. Within each node of the graph based template
are a number of attack actions that can be performed.
The simulation model accepts the inputs for the graph-based template adjacency matrix
and the actions that are possible in the different stages of the template in text file form. The logic
for reading these text files and creating the data matrix in the simulation model can be viewed in
Figure 1.
'Read in guidance template adjacency matrix from guidance template file and save in array start
Linecount =0
Do while Not EOF(6) 'Loop defines the guidance template
Line input #6, CurrentLine
charcount = 0
Do while Not Mid (cur rentLine, charcount + 1, l) -
""
GAdjacencyO-inecount, charcount) = clnt(Mid(CurrentLine, charcount + 1, 1))
charcount - charcount + 1
Loop










Linecount = Linecount + 1
Charcount = 1
Else
StageActions (Linecount, Charcount, 1) = a
input #7, a
StageActions (Linecount, Charcount, 2) = a





'Read in guidance template adjacency matrix from guidance template file and save in array - end
Figure 4 - Automatic Attack Generation Input Setup
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A diagram of the graph-based template that the simulation model currently operates
under is shown in Figure 2. The graph is a directed graph, which means that an edge only
indicates a feasible stage transition in the direction that the edge is pointing. Nodes within the
same group form a complete graphK where n is the number of nodes in the group. A complete
graph is a graph where every node in the graph is connected to every other node in the graph by
an edge. This concept is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 5 - Graph-based Template
Figure 6 - Group Forming a Complete Graph
An adjacency matrix is an m x m matrix where m represents the number of nodes
in the
graph. The entries of an adjacency matrix are 1 's and O's where entry (ij) is 1 if there is a
directed edge from node / to node./. Note that i is the row is the column. For example, in
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the adjacency matrix shown in Table 1, the entry (0,4) is 1 because there is an edge from SO to
S4 in the graph in Figure 1 . The entry (4,0) is 0 because there is no directed edge from S4 to SO.
Table 1 - Graph-based Template AdjacencyMatrix
To Node;








0 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4
5 1 1 1 1
6 1 1 1 1
7 1 1 1 1
8 1 1 1 1
9
The nodes in the graphs in Figures 1 and 2 represent the stages of an attack. Within each
stage there are a number of actions that can be performed. The following list describes the types
of actions that can occur during the different stages of the simulated attack using the current
graph-based template (Sudit, Stotz, & Holender, 2005):
Stage 0: Intrusion-Other, Reconnaissance-Enumeration, Reconnaissance-Footprinting,
Miscellaneous-Other
Stage 1 : Intrusion-User, Intrusion-Other, Miscellaneous-Other
Stage 2: Escalation-Service, Escalation-Other
Stage 3: Intrusion-Root
Stage 4: Goal-Denial of Service, Goal-Backdoor, Goal-Pilfering
Stage 5: Intrusion-Other, Reconnaissance-Enumeration, Reconnaissance-Footprinting,
Miscellaneous-Other, Reconnaissance-Scanning
Stage 6: Miscellaneous-Other, Intrusion-Other, Intrusion-User
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Stage 7: Escalation-Service, Escalation-Other
Stage 8: Intrusion-Root
Stage 9: Goal-Denial of Service, Goal-Backdoor, Goal-Pilfering
A graphical user interface (GUI) is used to specify many simulation model parameters.
The GUI for automatic attack generation can be seen in Figure 4. As new parameters were
created for the automatic attack generation methodology, a new GUI needed to be created. The
GUI still requires specification of a scenario name, noise parameters and run time after the last
attack completes. The difference is in the way that attacks are specified. A user will enter the
number of attacks that they wish to generate and for each attack, they will specify the target IP
address upon which they want a specified goal to be achieved. A measure of the efficiency of
the attacker and the stealth level of the attacker must also be specified as well as the overall delay
time for the attack and the average delay between steps. For a complete instruction on the use of
the GUI in specifying model parameters for automatic attack generation, reference Appendix G.
To develop feasible attack paths, a new methodology for defining attacks parameters of
the simulation model logic had to be created. The idea behind the automatic attack generation
methodology is to work backwards, defining the steps of the attack in reverse, until the logic
terminates with the initial step of the attack. Two matrices are vital to the automatic attack
generation methodology: the machine connection matrix and the graph-based template adjacency
matrix. The machine connection matrix is used to identify new targets and attackers in the
automatic attack generation logic and the graph-based template adjacency matrix is used to
determine the progression of stages of the attack during each distinct exchange between an
attacker and a target. The machine connection matrix is generated during the initialization of the
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simulationmodel based on the network template modules that have been placed in the model and
the connections between these modules.
Automatic Attack Generation XI
AutomaticAttack Generation
Scenario Name: | Test scenario
attacks toqenerate: 1 5 *****
Attack 1 j Attack2 j Attack3 | Attack4 | Attacks |
Target IP: Goal on Target:
| 100.10,20.1 ^j | Pilfering ^j
Efficiency of Hacker (0-1): | 9 Stealth Level of Hacker (0-1): | 5
This Is a measure of how quickly the This Is a measure of the hackers tendancy
hacker will pentrate and achieve the to achieve goals on machines other than
goal. A higher efficiency score with the target. More goals wi occur on other
provide more direct attacks and higher machines besides the target with a low
success rates. stealth score.
Delay This AttackBy (mins): | 5 SSStJSSLt^ 1 2
Atobe: Alerts Per Hour:
| 60
TypeofNotee: Percentage:
Time to Run After Last
Attack is Complete:
< 1W Reconnaissance j 97 l




N7 Miscellaneous | 1 Done
,
Figure 7 - Automatic Attack Generation GUI
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4.2.2AutomaticAttack Generation Logic
The automatic attack generation logic is series of loops that execute until conditions
relative to the attacker's movement through the network are met. The logic processes for each
attack that the user creates in the GUI when the simulation model run begins. The parameters
specified by the user will influence how the attack is generated. If the user specifies a high
efficiency score for the attack, the attack will have fewer steps and fewer detour attacks (attacks
off of the shortest path from the outside of the network to the target). If the user specifies a low
stealth score, more goal type actions will occur such as placement ofbackdoors, stealing of files


































Figure 8 - Automatic Attack Generation Logic
The first task that must be done is to obtain all of the necessary information of the current
attack being generated such as the target, goal, efficiency, stealth, and delay information. If the
target specified in the GUI is an internal machine, then the logic above will execute, otherwise it
will be skipped. As long as the target remains an internal machine, the logic above will continue
to execute. The first action that executes when entering this logic is the choice of an attacker.
The pseudo code in Figure 6 will help explain the logic for choosing an attacker.
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Go to connection matrix column for Target IP
Any entries with a 1 in that column go into a potential attackers array
Go to connection matrix row for Target IP
Any entries in the potential attackers array with a 1 in the row are lateral
moves, denote a 0 in the second row, entry column, of the potential
attackers array
Any entries in the potential attackers array with a 0 in the row are upward
moves, denote a 1 in the second row, entry column, of the potential
attackers array
sample from uniform(0,l) Distribution
If sampled value <= Efficiency Factor
Move up = 1
Else
Move up = 0
End if
sample from set of potential attackers with second row = Move up
current Attacker = sampled value
Figure 9 - Attacker Choice Logic
The goal of this logic is to determine all of the potential machines that could be the
attacker based solely on network topology, and then determine whether the potential attackers
are on the same level or a higher level in the network tree structure than the target. This is
achieved by evaluating the column and row of the connection matrix corresponding to the
current target. If there is a one in the connection matrix column corresponding to the current
target then the machine corresponding to the intersecting row is a potential attacker. A one in the
connection matrix row corresponding to the current target and the connection matrix column
corresponding to the potential attacker indicates that the potential attacker is on the same level of
the network tree structure as the target. A zero in the same position indicates that the potential
attacker is on a higher level of the network tree structure, indicating an upward (more efficient)
move. Noting the level in the network tree structure of the potential attackers is important when
choosing an attacker because based on the efficiency specified for the attack, the logic may
choose an attacker on the same level or on a higher level. The determination of the attacker from
the list ofpotential attackers is done in two steps. First, sampling a random number from zero to
one and comparing the resulting value to the efficiency score will determine if the logic will use
an attacker on the same level or a higher level. If the efficiency is greater than the random
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number, then the attacker will be from a higher level. Otherwise, the attacker will be from the
same level. Secondly, the logic samples a random attacker from the group of attackers chosen
(higher or same level). The attacker sampled becomes the attacker for the current series of attack
steps.
The next loop that the logic enters after the choice of the attacker is used to continuously
attack new targets until the logic determines that the progression of the attack will move to the
next higher level in the network tree structure. Within the loop for attack step generation, the
attacker will remain constant as the steps of the attack on the current target are generated. Then,
a new target will be chosen and the loop condition will be evaluated to determine if a new
attacker needs to be generated. The pseudo code in Figure 7 illustrates the process of creating
the individual steps of the attack.
if used Final Goal = False
Put GUI specified Goal in attack array
used Final Goal = True




if sampled value > stealth Factor
sample a subGroup from stage 9
Put sampled SubGroup in attack array
current Stage = 9
End if
Do while stagecomplete = False
if current Stage = None
sample from Stages 5-8
current Stage = Sampled Value
sample a subgroup from sampled Stage
Put sampled SubGroup in attack array
Else
Go to current stage column of Guidance Template
sample from Entries 5 or greater with a 1 to obtain stage
current stage = Sampled value
sample from uniform(o,l)
If sampled value <= Efficiency Factor
stage complete = True
current stage = None
End If
Loop
Figure 10 - Creating Individual Steps ofAttacks
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The first logic condition determines if an attack step for the GUI specified goal has been
set up. If the GUI specified target is an internal machine, then the first execution of the logic for
attack step generation will cause an attack step for the GUI specified goal to be created. Each
execution of the logic after the first will skip the attack step setup for the GUI specified goal.
In successive executions of the logic, the first action that is taken is to determine if there
will be a goal attack step during the current attacker/target exchange. This is determined by
generating a random number between zero and one and comparing the sampled value to the
stealth score. If the random number is greater than the stealth score, a goal attack step will be
generated. If the random number is less than the stealth score, no goal attack step will be
generated and the logic will continue to the next task.
The logic then moves into a loop used to create the remainder of the attack steps for the
current attacker/target exchange. Creating the remainder of the attack steps for the current
attacker/target exchange is accomplished by evaluating what types of stages from the graph-
based template have occurred and determining the possible connected stages from the graph-
based template. If there are any one's in the column of the graph-based template corresponding
to the stage that the most recent attack step came from, then actions from the stage corresponding
to the intersecting row can be the next actions of the attack. After achieving any stage after a
goal step on an internal machine, the logic has the ability to proceed to another machine.
Therefore, after each attack step is set up, a random number is generated between zero and one
and compared to the efficiency score to determine if the attack will move to another target. If the
sampled value is greater than the efficiency score, another stage will be sampled and another
attack step created from the sampled stage. If the sampled value is less than the efficiency score,
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the loop condition will change to false and the logic will move on to choose a new target. The
pseudo code in Figure 8 illustrates the logic for new target determination.
sample from uniform(0,l) Distribution
If sampled value <= Efficiency Factor
current Target = current Attacker
Else
End if
go to connection matrix row for current Attacker
Any entries with a 1 in that row go into the potential targets array
sample from potential targets
current Target = sampled value
clear potential targets array
Figure 11 - New Target Determination Logic
There are two possible groups of targets that can be chosen from. The new target can
become the previous attacker or the new target can become another machine on the same level in
the network tree structure as the current target. Figure 9 below illustrates the choices that can be
made for the new target.
Figure 12 - New Target Choice
In Figure 9, the solid square is the current attacker and the solid circle is the current
target. If the target will stay on the same level of the network tree structure, then the lowest
dashed circle is a potential target. If the attacker will become the new target, then the dashed
circle in the middle will be the new target. If the attacker becomes the new target then the
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dashed square is on the level of the network tree structure that the next attacker would come
from.
Choosing the previous attacker as the new target will model the way in which attackers
penetrate networks by exploiting machines at subsequent levels of the network tree structure in a
"leap-frogging"
manner. Attackers may also try to exploit many machines in the same subnet,
which can be modeled by choosing the next target as a machine from the same level of the
network tree structure.
To determine what machine the new target will be, a random number is generated and the
sampled value compared to the efficiency factor. If the sampled value is less than the efficiency
factor, the new target will become the current attacker. If the sampled value is greater than the
efficiency factor, a target on the same level of the network tree structure will be chosen.
Choosing a target on the same level of the network tree structure is accomplished by looking at
the connection matrix row for the current attacker. Any columns containing a one in the
connection matrix row corresponding to the current attacker indicates that the machine
corresponding to the column is a possible target. One target is sampled at random from all of the
potential targets.
If the new target is another machine on the same level of the network tree structure as the
previous target, then the loop condition ofdo while Attacker != Target will still be true and
the logic for generating attack steps will repeat again. The logic for creating attack steps and
choosing new targets will continue to repeat until the current attacker is chosen as the new target
during new target determination. When the new target becomes the current attacker, the loop
condition Do while Attacker != Target will evaluate to false. When the loop condition do
while Attacker i= Target evaluates to false, the target has moved up a level in the network
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tree structure. Therefore when a new attacker is chosen, the new attacker will be a level higher
in the network tree structure than the previous attacker. Continuing this looping process will
eventually cause the target to move to the highest level of the network tree structure and become
an external machine. When the target becomes an external machine, the loop condition Do
While Target = internal Machine will become false and the internal machine logic will
finish.
When the internal machine logic completes, the logic for external machines will begin.
Any targets specified in the GUI that are external machines will skip automatically to the
external machines logic. The second row of the flowchart in Figure 5 illustrates the processing
logic for external machines.
The external machine logic executes until the logic creates an attack complete condition,
which will cause the loop to exit. The first task that the logic performs is to sample some
random numbers to create a random IP address. A random IP address is necessary because when
hackers attack a network from the Internet, they use a "spoofed", or disguised IP address, which
is random. After generation of a random IP address, the logic for creating the individual attack
steps begins. The pseudo code in Figure 10 explains the logic for creating attack steps on
external machines.
The logic progression for creating attack steps on external machines is very similar to the
logic used to create attack steps on internal machines. The first condition is executed if the GUI
specified target is an external machine. If the GUI specified target is an internal machine or the
current iteration is not the first time the code has executed, the first condition will not be
executed. The difference between the logic for creating attack steps on external machines rather
than internal machines is in the termination of the logic.
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if used Final Goal = False
Put GUI specified Group in attack array
current stage = 4
Used Final Goal = True
Else
End if
Sample from Uniform(0,l) Distribution
if Sampled value > stealth Factor
sample a SubGroup from stage 4
Put sampled SubGroup in attack array
current Stage = 4
End if
do while stagecomplete = False
if current stage = None
sample from Stages 1-3
Sample a subgroup from sampled stage
Put sampled SubGroup in attack array
Current Stage = sampled stage
intrusion Required = False
Else
go to column of current stage in Guidance Template
sample from Entries with a 1
current stage = sampled value
If Current Stage = 1-3
Intrusion Required = False
End If
End If
If intrusion Required = False
sample from uniform(0,l)
If Sampled value <= Efficiency Factor
If current Stage = 1-3
sample a subGroup from stage 0
Put sampled subGroup in attack array
End If
Stage Complete = True




Figure 13 - Creating Attack Steps on External Machines
There are two conditions that must be satisfied for the termination of the logic for
creating attack steps. First, an action from stages 1-3 must be completed before the logic can
terminate. Once an action from stage 1-3 has been completed, the sampling of a random value
and comparison to the efficiency factor can occur. If the sampled value is greater than the
efficiency factor, then the attack step creation loop will repeat and additional attack steps will be
created. If the sampled value is less than the efficiency factor, then the loop for creating attack
steps will end and the second condition for attack stage termination will be evaluated. The
second condition is that the last action to take place must be an action from stage zero.
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Therefore, when the logic determines that the attack stage will finish, if the current stage is not
stage zero, then an attack step with an action from stage zero will be generated. Once an action
from stage zero has occurred, then the attack step creation logic can end.
To determine if the attack will continue, a random value is sampled between zero and one
and compared to the efficiency factor. If the sampled value is less than the efficiency factor, the
loop condition will be changed to false and the loop for the external machines will end. If the
sampled value is greater than the efficiency factor, a new target will be chosen.
Now that the attacker is attacking from the Internet, the only targets that the attacker can
reach are external machines. Therefore, a random external machine is chosen to be the next
target. Logic is included to make sure the previous target is not chosen as the new target. After
a new target is chosen, the loop repeats with the sampling of a random attacker IP address and
the creation of the attack steps for the new target.
Once the loop for external machines has ended, the entire process ends for the current
attack. The process repeats for every attack that the user specified in the GUI. When all attacks
are complete, the resulting array of important simulation model parameters is complete.
However, the array will be in reverse order because the attacks are generated in reverse.
Therefore, the last processing step is to reverse the order of the array so that the last item in the
array becomes the first, the second to last item becomes the second and so on, until the first item
in the original array has become the last item in the new array. At this point, automatic attack
generation has completed with all of the important simulation model parameters ordered properly
in the parameter array.
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4.2.3 Capabilities andLimitations
The automatic attack generation methodology significantly improves the capabilities of
the cyber attack simulation methodology developed by Kuhl and Kistner in 2005. The
simulation methodology now has the ability to quickly generate attacks in a random but feasible
pattern without a great deal of user input. This will help to improve the objectiveness of the
simulation methodology. The original methodology was heavily biased on the user who input
the data required by the simulation model because the user specified the attack path in the
original model. The new methodology is much more robust to user bias because of the random
generation of the attack path. In addition, the process of setting up the attacks that the user
wishes to simulate is much less input intensive with automatic attack generation. The user does
not need to bother with the intermediate steps of the attack, which may be unimportant to many
users. Also, for the same input factors the automatic attack generation could develop many
different feasible attack paths to reach the same goal on the same target. With the addition of
automatic attack generation, a user can automatically create a great deal of the feasible paths that
an attacker could take to reach a given target and goal withminimal user input.
However, there are some subsets of the feasible attack paths which are not possible with
the current version of automatic attack generation. In order for automatic attack generation to
work, the method for calculating the connection matrix had to be adjusted slightly from the
original methodology. The changes were necessary in order to simulate the
"leap-frogging"
maneuvers of attackers as they penetrate a network.
As the calculation of the connection matrix is independent of the attack specification
engine, the change to the connection matrix calculation affects both automatic attack generation
and the manual attack generation methodology. The change in the calculation method prevents a
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user of the manual attack generation methodology from creating attacks in which the target is on
a higher level of the network tree structure than the attacker (attacking upwards). This type of
activity is uncommon when attackers are initiating their attack from the Internet but it might be
necessary for a target to be on a higher level of the network tree structure than the attacker when
modeling an inside attack. An inside attacker is an attacker who already has access to the
network, like an employee or contractor, who can begin their attack from within the private
network. An inside attacker is also known as "insider threat."
The automatic attack generation also does not cover every possible attack path that an
attacker can take through a network. Attack paths with detours through more than one level of
the network tree structure are not possible with the current version of automatic attack
generation. Figure 1 1 and 12 explain detours and the limitations that detours have in the current
version of automatic attack generation.
The progression in Figure 1 1 is not possible because the attack takes an initial detour
(steps one and two) that is deeper than one level of the network tree structure. The progression
in Figure 12 is possible because the initial detour (step one) is only one level of the network tree
structure deep.
The automatic attack generation methodology is also limited by some parameters of the
base simulation model. Specifically, the maximum number of steps that can be created for an
attack in the current simulation model is 30. However, specifying a very low efficiency could
result in far more than 30 steps. The current automatic attack generation methodology is
therefore limited to attacks with a maximum of 30 steps. Stopping the automatic attack
generation methodology when 30 steps are reached can result in attacks that have not been
generated completely.
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Figure 14 - Attack Progression Not Possible
Figure 15 - Attack Progression Possible
4.3Addition ofFurtherMachineAttributes
The attributes of a machine can limit the forms of actions that can occur on a particular
machine. In the simulation methodology, the network topology determines the connectivity
attributes of the machines, which allows the user to set up attack actions against a machine
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depending on the source machine of their attack. All actions are currently feasible methods of
attacking a given machine but depending on the attributes of the machine, this may not be the
case. Attributes such as the type of machine (PC or server) or the operating system of the
machine could have an impact on the types of actions that can feasibly be performed. By
allowing a user to specify these attributes for machines in the simulation model and by defining
the actions in terms of the machines attributes, further accuracy and feasibility can be obtained
from generated attacks.
4.3.1 AttributeDefinitions
There are hundreds of attributes that could be added to the machines in the simulation
model template. However, in order to keep the model building process simple, a few key
attributes ofa machine have been added to themachine module of the simulation template.
The first attribute is the machine type which indicates the machine's purpose on the
network. Most machines in a network are either a workstation (usually a desktop computer) or a
server. Thus, two different machine types created for the simulation model are workstation and
server. The hardware used in a workstation machine and a server is very similar but the software
is vastly different. This difference is the reason why machine type was included as a machine
attribute. The actions that attackers perform against machines on a network are usually highly
dependant on the software of the machine rather than the hardware. Therefore, even though the
two different machine types can look physically identical at times, they are far different from a
hacker's prospective.
The second attribute defined is the operating system. The operating system is one of the
most distinguishing features of a machine. Whether the machine is a workstation or server, each
machine has an operating system which manages the hardware and software resources. In
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addition, the operating system manages network communications at the machine level. Because
the operating system handles so much of the processing and communication of the machine, the
operating system is one of the first things that a hacker tries to identify when attempting to attack
a machine.
The properties of the operating system also vary from one operating system to another.
In addition, hackers find different flaws that can be exploited in different operating systems. For
example, certain actions which can affect a machine with a Windows operating system may not
be able to affect a machine with a Linux operating system. Therefore, the machine's operating
system limits the types of actions that can be performed against the machine.
4.3.2Attribute Implementation in Simulation Template
To add the above mentioned machine attributes to the machine module of the simulation
template, the template needed to be adjusted. Currently, when a machine module is added to a
model, the user may double-click on the module to open the module dialog box and specify
information about the machine. Choices for the machine type and the operating system needed
to be added to this dialog box.
To add the machine type and operating system choices, two additional operands were
added to the existing machine module operands in the operand window. The operands were
setup as radio button groups. There are two choices for the machine type: PC and Server. PC
represents the workstation and Server represents a server. There are four choices for the
operating system: Windows XP, Windows 2000, Linux and Unix. The changes made to the






















Figure 16 - MachineModule Dialog Box Changes
The logic for the machine module also needed to be updated so that the values for the
machine type and operating system operands could be stored in the existing machine variable.
The values of the radio button groups are numbers corresponding to the option chosen. The PC
option returns a value of 1 and the Server option returns a value of 0. The number for the
machine type is assigned to the machine variable array in position seven. For the operating
system, the Windows XP option returns a 0, the Windows 2000 option returns a 1, the Linux
option returns a 2 and the Unix option returns a 3. The value for the operating system is stored
in the machine variable array in position eight. In addition, the appearance of the module when
placed in the model window was adjusted so that the information that the model builder specified








Figure 17 - New User View for Machine Module
4.3.3 Action File Definition
In addition to updating the simulation template, the action definitions needed to be
adjusted as well. To limit the actions that can occur on a particular machine based on the
machine's attributes, the actions needed to be defined in terms of the machine attributes. Thus,
the actions input file for the simulation model needed to be adjusted so that actions were
specified for certain machine types and operating systems.
In the current actions file, actions are identified by their action group and action
subgroup. In order for the actions to be limited by machine type and operating system, the
specific machine type and operating system that the action will work for must be specified for
each action. If an action can work for bothmachine types or formultiple operating systems, then
the action must be listed for each unique machine type and operating system configuration that is
feasible. Thus, some actions may be listed multiple times. The lines in Figure 15 show the
definition of an action, "EXPLOIT nips x86 Solaris
overflow,"
that is feasible for a PC or Server
running Windows XP.
"Escalation", "os", "pc", "windows xp", "exploit nips x86 Solaris
overflow"
"Escalation", "os", "server", "windows xp", "exploit nips x86 Solaris
overflow"
Figure 18 - New Action Definition Example
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When the action file definitions are read at the beginning of the simulation run, the
machine attributes feasible for the action are stored in additional indexes of the existing actions
array. The codes for each action were kept the same to reduce the complexity of the simulation
logic upgrade.
4.3.4 Integration
With the improvement to the simulation template, the simulation model can distinguish
unique attributes of each machine created. In addition, with the updates to the action input file,
the different actions are now dependant on the machine attributes. Using some additional logic,
the simulation model can now create attacks in which only actions which are specific to the
attributes of the machine being attacked are available.
If the user decides to set up an attack using the manual method, the list ofpossible actions
that they can choose is dependant on the target that they have chosen. Thus, the actions available
for the user to choose in the action combo box in the GUI are limited to the actions feasible to
the chosen target's machine attributes. Additional functionality was built in to eliminate the
possibility of the user selecting a subgroup of actions which contain no actions feasible to the
chosen target. Previously, the user could leave combo boxes blank and the simulation model
would choose an action, sub group, or group at random based on the number of combo boxes
that were left blank. Logic was added to ensure that the randomly chosen elements of the action
were feasible to the chosen target's attributes as well.
When using the automatic attack generation logic, simple loops were implemented to
ensure that the actions chosen were feasible to the target chosen. In the automatic attack
generation logic, action groups and subgroups are chosen based on a graph-based template that
defines the logical progression of attack actions. Functionality was incorporated to ensure that
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the group and subgroup chosen contained feasible actions. If the group and subgroup did not
contain feasible actions, another group and subgroup were selected until a feasible set was found.
Once the group and subgroup were chosen, actions were chosen at random and evaluated to
determine if they met the machine attribute criteria of the chosen target. If the attributes did not
match, another action was chosen until a match was found.
4.4 Verification and Validation
Verification and validation is a necessary activity for any simulation model. Ensuring
that the model performs as designed and the results of the simulation are true to the system being
modeled is essential. A verified and validated model enables the modeler to confidently draw
conclusions from the results and take action to improve a system based on those conclusions.
However, if themodel is not validated, conclusions drawn may not necessarily be correct.
To verify and validate the cyber attack simulation model, several steps needed to be
taken. First, the generation of attacks using the manual method needed to be validated. Second,
the automatic generation of attacks needed to be investigated to ensure that valid attacks were
being generated. Third, production of noise, creation of output files, and network template
module input needed to be verified.
A sample network was created to test the cyber attack simulation model. Although this
network was small in order to be manageable, the network was setup with common network
entities that one would see in a real network. These entities included external servers of varying
operating system and subnets of internal machines. Internal servers were setup for one subnet as
well. The sample network is shown in Figure 16.
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Figure 19 - Sample Network for Verification and Validation
4.4.1 Verification ofManualAttack Generation
Four scenarios were used to test the manual attack generation methodology. The first
scenario involved minimal input to test the smallest amount of information required to run the
simulation. The second scenario involved a single attack with six steps which represents a
common cyber attack. The third scenario had multiple attacks indicative of common cyber
attacks and the attacks were setup to overlap one another. The fourth scenario contains 10
attacks, each with 30 steps and was created to verify the input upper limits for the manual attack
generationmethodology.
Each scenario was setup with the same noise generation parameters. These parameters
were the number of alerts to produce per hour, the percentage of each group type that alerts
should take and the additional run time after the last attack was complete. The number of alerts
per hour was set to 5,000 per hour for each scenario and the percentages for each group were
60% for reconnaissance, 15% for intrusion, 15% for escalation, 5% for goal, and 5% for
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miscellaneous. Each scenario was also set to run for an additional five minutes after the last
attack was completed.
In scenario one, the total run time was five minutes simulation time. This shows that the
additional run time is operating correctly because the attack in scenario one was setup to
complete at time zero. In the GUI, the attacker IP was selected as "external" and the resulting
target IP choices were all machines with external access, proving that the external functionality
works properly.
In the second scenario, the attack setup was consistent with the ground truth of the attack
scenario. In addition, the options for targets, both when the source was external and when IP
address 100.10.20.5 was used, were valid. Finally, the total simulation run time for scenario two
was 90 minutes. This is consistent with the total attack time of 60 minutes and the attack delay
of30 minutes.
The third scenario involved three attacks occurring simultaneously. The output for each
attack was accurate to the input specified. In addition, the second of the three attacks completed
first because the attack delay and attack duration were shorter than the other two attacks.
The fourth scenario had 10 attacks, each with 30 steps. This scenario was setup to verify
the maximum number of attacks that could be created and the maximum number of steps in each
attack. The attack ran successfully, proving that the upper limits of attack specification were
working properly.
4.4.2 Validation ofAutomatic Attack GenerationMethodology
To validate the automatic attack generation methodology, several scenarios were





efficiency and stealth parameters were set to be either high (0.9), medium (0.5), or low (0.2). All
50
possible efficiency and stealth level combinations were examined, resulting in nine different
scenarios as shown in Table 2.




High Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Medium Scenario 4 Scenario 5 Scenario 6
Low Scenario 7 Scenario 8 Scenario 9
Five attacks were run for each scenario, each with a target on the network level shown in
Figure 17. Each attack was delayed by 10 minutes and the average delay time between steps was
set to be 10 minutes. Noise was set to occur at a frequency of 5,000 alerts per hour with 60%
reconnaissance alerts, 15% intrusion alerts, 15% escalation alerts, 5% goal alerts, and 5%
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Figure 20 - Targets for Attack Scenarios
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To verify whether the attack progression created was valid, each attack was evaluated on
a number of criteria. First, the attack's progression through the network was validated to ensure
that it aligned with the network topology. Second, the progression of the attack at each machine
was validated to ensure that the actions taken were feasible. Third, the number of failed attack
actions was measured to test the "efficiency" parameter. Finally, the number of additional goals
besides the final goals for each attack was measured to test the "stealth" parameter. The inputs
set for each scenario compared to the resulting outputs for each scenario are shown in Table 3.
Table 3 - Inputs Compared to Outputs
Input Output Input Output
Efficiency Success Rate Stealth Additional Goals
Scenario 1 0.9 0.91 0.9 2
Scenario 2 0.9 0.94 0.5 6
Scenario 3 0.9 0.91 0.2 12
Scenario 4 0.5 0.44 0.9 21
Scenario 5 0.5 0.51 0.5 67
Scenario 6 0.5 0.46 0.2 83
Scenario 7 0.2 0.9
Scenario 8 0.2 - 0.5
Scenario 9 0.2 - 0.2
In scenario one, both the efficiency and stealth parameters were set high. This resulted in
attacks that quickly arrived at the final target in 5-6 steps. Figure 18 shows the first attack's
progression through the network. The progression of each attack through the network was valid
based on the network topology. In addition, each attack had valid attack action progression at
each machine. Three failed actions were recorded out of a total of 37, resulting in a success
percentage of 91%. This corresponds to the 0.9 value of the efficiency parameter. In addition,
there were only two additional goals across the five attacks. This small number of additional
goals is because the stealth value was set high.
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Figure 21 - Scenario 1, Attack 1 Progression
Scenario two consisted of attacks with high efficiency and medium stealth. These attacks
generated similar attack progression but contained six additional goals rather than two. The
topology progressions as well as the attack action progression within each machine were both
valid. Two failures occurred out of total of 36 actions, resulting in a 94% success rate which
corresponds to the high efficiency parameter.
Scenario three had attacks with high efficiency and low stealth. This scenario also
exhibited attacks with few detours but there were 12 additional goals, reflective of the low stealth
score. The topology progression was valid as was the attack action progression at each machine.
A total of four failures were identified out of 44 attack actions resulting in a 91% success rate.
Scenario four exhibited much more erratic attack progression because of the medium
efficiency score. Many machines were attacked that were out of the shortest path to the final
target. Although the movement through the network was erratic, the progression was still valid
based on the network topology. The attack action progression at each machine was much longer
with the lower efficiency score than in previous scenarios but the attack action progressions were
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still valid as well. A total of99 failures were recorded out of a total of 179 attack actions. These
failures result in a success rate of 44%, corresponding to the efficiency parameter value of 0.5.
In this case there were 21 additional goals to the final goals of each attack. The reason that this
number is high even though the stealth parameter was set high is because there were many more
opportunities for additional goals to occur due to the low efficiency score.
Scenario five also exhibited a number of unnecessary attack steps to reach the final goal
because of the lower efficiency score. Figure 19 shows the attack progression of attack three.
The topology progression and the attack action progression were both valid for all attacks in this
scenario. There were 1 14 total failures in this scenario out of a total of236 actions. This results
in a success rate of 51% which corresponds to the 0.5 efficiency value. A total of 67 additional
goals were identified which reflects the decreasing stealth value from the previous scenario.
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Figure 22 - Scenario 5, Attack 3 Progression
Scenario six also exhibited erratic attacks because of the lower efficiency score. The
topology progression of the attacks was valid as was the attack action progression within each
machine. This scenario had 132 failures out of 248 actions resulting in a success rate of 46%.
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There were a total of 83 additional goals in this scenario which corresponds to the low value for
the stealth parameter.
The last three scenarios had low efficiency scores which caused extremely erratic attacks
to be generated. Although these types of attacks are technically feasible, the current simulation
methodology can only support attacks with 30 steps. When a very low efficiency is specified,
attacks generated quickly reach the maximum number of steps in the attack before they are
completed. Thus, these attacks are not very useful for analysis. The maximum number of steps
in an attack needs to be increased for low efficiency attacks to be generated.
4.4.3 Noise Production, Template, and File Creation Verification
Several things needed to be verified in addition to the attack generation methodologies.
Specifically, within the attack generation methodologies, the production of noise needed to be
verified for accuracy. In addition, the variables and stations created from the network simulation
template modules needed to be verified. Finally, the creation of some output files is dependant
on choices for sensors on network simulation template modules and the creation of these output
files needed to be verified as well.
To verify the production of noise, scenarios were run in which minimal input is required.
In these situations, practically all of the output is due to noise and these alerts can be counted,
classified, and evaluated. There are three things that needed to be verified for the production of
noise. First, the amount of noise that occurred in each scenario needed to be verified against the
number of noise alerts per hour that was setup for each scenario. Second, the percentages of
each type of alert that can be used for noise needed to be verified. Finally, the percentage of
noise that occurs on internal machines and external machines needed to be verified as well.
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Through several scenarios generated by the automatic attack generation methodology, the
amount of noise present was evaluated. Each scenario consisted of a single attack and the attack
target and goal was the same for each scenario. In addition, the initial delay time and the average
delay time between steps was set to 10 minutes. Table 4 shows the inputs compared to the
outputs for the noise creation validation.
Table 4 - Inputs Compared to Outputs for Noise Generation
Input Alerts Hour Simulation Time Total Alerts Output Alerts Hour
Scenario 1 60 58 mins 64 62
Scenario 2 800 71 mins 1,127 955
Scenario 3 5,000 64 mins 4,674 4,409
Scenario 4 30.000 87 mins 37.491 26,589
In the first scenario, the number of alerts per hour was set to 60. Running this simulation
took 58 total minutes simulation time. The total number of alerts generated in this scenario was
64. With 58 minutes and 64 alerts, the number of alerts per hour generated is 62.
In the second scenario, the number of alerts per hour was set to 800. The total simulation
run time was 71 minutes and the number of alerts generated during this time was 1,127. This
results in 955 alerts per hour which corresponds to the 800 alerts per hour set up.
The third scenario had the number of alerts per hour set to 5,000. The simulation run
time was 64 minutes and the total number of alerts generated was 4,674. The resulting number
of alerts per hour for the simulation run was 4,409.
The number of alerts per hour in the third scenario was set to 30,000 to reflect the
frequency of alerts that a large company might see. The time for the run was 87 minutes in
simulation time and the total number of alerts generated was 37,491. The resulting alerts per
hour for the simulation run were 26,589 which correspond to the 30,000 alerts per hour that was
setup for the scenario.
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A scenario was created to evaluate the types of alerts generated based on the percentages
specified. The percentages used for testing were: 60% reconnaissance, 15% intrusion, 15%
privilege escalation, 5% goal, and 5% miscellaneous. The scenario was run for a total of five
minutes at 5,000 alerts per hour, generating a total of 107 alerts. Of the 107 alerts, 44 were
reconnaissance alerts, 31 were intrusion alerts, 13 were privilege escalation alerts, 16 were goal
alerts and 4 were miscellaneous. Although not exactly correct because the alert distributions are
random rather than exact, the trends show that the percentages seem to be working properly.
Usingmore alerts would only further verify that the percentages are functioning correctly.
The example network used for validating the manual and automatic attack generation
methodologies was used to test the creation ofvariables and stations from the network simulation
template modules as well. The example resulted in 20 machine variable arrays created. Each of
the machine variables reflects the information input in the modules. The modules also create 20
stations, one for each machine. To see the complete data that shows the variables and stations,
refer to Appendix H.
Lastly, the creation of output files needed to be verified. When the user creates a sensor
on either a connector module or a machine module, a corresponding alert file should be created.
Several different network detection configurations were used to test the creation of these files.
Two scenarios were simple scenarios that one might see in a regular network. Another scenario
has no connector sensors and one scenario has no machine sensors. The last scenario has a
sensor at every possible place in the network. All files which were intended to be created existed
at the end of the simulation runs for each scenario. To see each of the scenarios and the resulting
files created, refer to Appendix H.
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4.4.4 Summary
Verification and validation is very important because it allows a modeler to draw
conclusions from a simulation with confidence that the simulation reflects the real system to the
degree necessary for analysis. To verify the manual attack generation methodology, several
examples were generated to make sure that the input for attacks matched the output and that
valid targets were presented for different choices of attackers. In addition, the minimal amount
of input was used as well as the maximum amount of input to test the methodology at the input
bounds.
Validation of the automatic attack generation methodology was also necessary. Several
more examples were created to do the validation, each with varying degrees of attack parameter
input. Each of these examples was validated for correct network topology progression as well as
attack action progression within each attacked machine. In addition, the success rate was
validated as well as the creation of additional goals besides each attack's final goal.
Noise creation was validated as well to ensure that the proper amount of noise alerts and
the correct percentage of alert types were being generated. Several scenarios were tested to
examine this with all examples showing that noise creation was working properly. The creation
of the machine variables, stations, and output files from template modules were examined with a
number of examples as well and found to be valid.
With these validation techniques performed, the model has been properly validated. As a
result, an analyst may comfortably draw conclusions from the results of a simulation run. In
addition, the data from simulations can be used to test other systems.
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5. Investigation of Process Refinement in the Cyber Domain
Cyber security is growing problem and as result, systems are being developed to assist
systems administrators detect and track cyber attacks. Specifically, information fusion systems
have been developed to correlate IDS alerts into meaningful attack situations. From these attack
situations, other parts of the fusion system can measure the impact of the attack situations and
estimate the threat that the attack scenario might pose in the future.
Process Refinement acts after the threat projection to refine and improve the fusion
system to improve the capabilities of the system in detecting, tracking, and interpreting the attack
scenarios. This section introduces the topic of Process Refinement and explains how Process
Refinement is unique compared to the other levels of information fusion. Process Refinement's
application to cyber security and Process Refinements role in a cyber security fusion system will
also be discussed. Finally, an initial integer programming optimization model for Process
Refinement is presented and examined.
5.1 Process Refinement ConceptualModel
The concept of Process Refinement is to optimize the data acquisition and interpretation
functions of an information fusion system. This is achieved by examining the output of the
various levels of fusion and identifying areas where information should be obtained, where
information is lacking, where the integrity of the information is less than desirable and many
other areas. However, there may be many different types of improvements that could be
implemented, many of which are mutually exclusive in the analysis required. For example,
suggestions pertaining to what sensor information to process are independent from
recommendations pertaining to correcting sensor errors. In addition to using information from
other levels of information fusion, the improvement methods may use input from or provide
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output to other improvement methods. From the example earlier, the suggestion pertaining to
sensor error correction may feed into the suggestion pertaining to which sensor information to
process so that information from the malfunctioning sensor is not obtained until the sensor errors
are corrected. Thus, a system of Modular Process Refinement is suggested in which each
module of Process Refinement handles a different type of improvement. The modules will
interact with other levels of information fusion and with each other. Figure 20 illustrates the
concept of Modular Process Refinement and how Modular Process Refinement fits into the
fusion realm. Some improvement methods might include changes to guidance templates,
adjustments to sensors, using alternative correlation methods or a number of other
improvements. The focus of this thesis will be the dynamic management of sensing resource
information provided to the fusion system and from this point further, the term Process
Refinement will pertain to the dynamic management of sensing resource information.
Figure 23 - Modular Process Refinement
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5.2 SensorManagement and Process Refinement
In the realm of information fusion, there are two terms that are often used
interchangeably to describe the fourth level of information fusion: Sensor Management and
Process Refinement. It is important to point out the distinction between the two in the cyber
domain because they describe very different tasks. The task of Sensor Management involves
determining the placement of sensors in a network, often using an optimization technique
associated with the cost of placing a sensor and the benefit that the sensor will bring. Process
Refinement is a more dynamic type of analysis in that as new information is obtained from other
levels of fusion, Process Refinement adapts to the new information, making iterative
recommendations for improvement.
Many network security advisors recommend placing both host-based and network-based
sensors. The placement of the two types of sensors depends on the topology of the network and
the criticality of the machines in the network. Network-based sensors could be placed before or
after external firewalls, on major network junctions or on critical subnets. Placing the sensors in
these locations allows a network analyst to get a very broad view of the network situation,
enabling better detection of attacks. Optimization can be used to determine where the sensors
will be located based on a number of constraints, costs and values of the different location points
in the network.
Sensor management has many benefits in other settings but falls slightly short in
usefulness in the cyber domain. The problem with sensor management in the cyber domain is
that the costs of placing sensors in the cyber domain are often very small. Many network and
host-based sensors are open-source programs, meaning that they can be downloaded for minimal
to no cost. In the case of host-based sensors, if the software does not cost anything, then the
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entire sensor system does not cost anything because the hardware requirements are met by the
machine on which the sensor will be placed. Network sensors do require hardware to run the
sensor software but with decreasing costs of computers, the cost requirement of hardware
becomes very low.
As a result, many sensor management optimization models may result in an optimal
solution of sensor placement with a sensor in nearly every location on the network. The problem
with sensor placement at every network location is that the majority of systems which process
sensor data would become overloaded in trying to process data from so many sources.
Therefore, it is ideal to have a sensor at every location in the network from a detection standpoint
because every possible attack could be detected but it is not feasible to obtain the data from all
sensors at once. However, the majority of the time, data from all sensors is not needed because
attackers are usually not attacking every network location at once. Thus, at different points in
time, there are different attack situations occurring that require different resources for detection.
As a result, using an optimization model to determine which sensors to obtain data from based
on a given situation is necessary.
5.3 Process RefinementMathematicalModel
By defining Process Refinement in terms of a mathematical optimization model, optimal
solutions for the management of network detection resources can be determined. Specifically,
Process Refinement is concerned with maximizing the value of information that is obtained. In
Process Refinement, value refers to the system administrator's perceived value of the
information on a machine. When Process Refinement maximizes the value of the information
that is obtained, the system administrator can be assured that given a situation in which all data
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can not be obtained, data from the machines which the administrator considers most valuable
will be obtained.
There are three parts to every mathematical optimization model: decision variables,
objective function, and constraints. The decision variables are the factors that the mathematical
model is trying to optimize. The objective function is a function of the decision variables and
scalars such as cost, distance, value, etc., such that changing the value of a decision variable
changes the value of the objective function. The assignment of the values of the decision
variables is motivated towards the objective definition ofminimize or maximize. Constraints are
functions of the decision variables and scalars that limit the values of the decision variables that
can be chosen, thereby limiting the value that the objective function can obtain.
The decision variables in Process Refinement are based on three dimensions: the type of
information, the information source, and the machine on which the source is located. Types of
information include alert messages, sensor preprocessor alerts, logs, and many other types.
Sources of information are any type of sensing resource such as a network-based IDS sensor,
host-based IDS sensor, System Log output and many others. As a result of the decision to place
a sensor everywhere in the network, each source can be obtained from each different machine. It
is understood that some types of information are not feasible to some information sources. This
problem is handled by specifying sets of information that are feasible to each sensor.
In Process Refinement, the objective is to maximize the total value of the information
obtained based on the current situation. Using the constraints, the optimization model effectively
eliminates the selection ofmachines which can not possibly be targeted next based on the current
situation. The resulting reduction in the information to gather from a situation in which all data
is collected is described in an example in Figure 21. In the diagram, there are three network-
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based IDS, one for each switch and nine machines each of which could have x information
sources. Thus the number of sources which would need to be processed in a situation where
every source is processed is 9x + 3. The machine at the top of the tree structure is the only
compromised machine based on the current situations so the two machines at the next level down
in the tree structure are threatened but the remaining machines are not. This would result in a
total of 3x + 1 total sources to be processed if Process Refinement were used because the
machines at the third level of the tree structure are not threatened and therefore, can provide no
useful information about the next attack steps based on the current situation.












Figure 24 - Information Reduction
The following descriptions define the decision variables and scalars of the Process
Refinement mathematical model and the model is shown in Figure 22. In the following
statements, the term
"information"
pertains to the different types of information that a sensor can
report such as alerts, preprocessor alerts, etc. The source of information pertains to the sensor or
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system log from which the information is coming. The machine on which a sensor source is
located is themachine in the network that contains the sensor.
Decision Variables:
(1 if information i is obtained from sourcey on machine k
0 otherwise
i = Information (Alerts, Preprocessor Information, etc.)
j = Source of Information (Sensor, Log, etc.)
k = Machine onWhich Source is Located
Scalars:
Z = the objective function value
v* = value of information contained on machine k
Cyk - bandwidth requirement for extracting information i from source./ on machine k
B = bandwidth limit
Pijk = processing requirements for information i from source./ on machine k
L =maximum processing power available to the fusion engine
tk= threat level (0 to 1) from fusion Level 3: Threat Assessment formachine k
Dyi = ability of information / from source,/ to detect action / (0 or 1)
S4k = set of all actions that can be performed next on machine k (from set S4 of fusion Level 3:
Threat Assessment)
Fj = set of all information (i) feasible to source./
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Figure 25 - Process Refinement Mathematical Model
The objective of the optimization model is to maximize the total value obtained by
selecting types of information from different information sources on different machines in the
network. Maximizing the sum of the products of the values and the decision variables for all
dimensions of the decision variables which are feasible, as shown in equation (1), will maximize
the total value of the information selected. The first constraint, equation (2), limits the
information that can be obtained based on the bandwidth of the network connection between the
sensor data collection sites and the information fusion processing engine. The second constraint,
equation (3), limits the information that can be obtained based on the processing power of the
information fusion processing engine. If information files are large, then less information can be
obtained. The third constraint, equation (4), limits the selection of information from machines
with no threat. The fourth constraint, equation (5), limits the information selected so that only
information types and sources that can provide information about the next possible actions on
each machine are selected.
66
5.4Model Implementation
To show that themathematical model works as intended, the model was built using ILOG
OPL Studio in the Optimization Programming Language (OPL). The benefit of using OPL
Studio is that the model can be built genetically and data files can be used to adjust the inputs to
the model from situation to situation. Figures 23 and 24 show the model that was built in OPL
Studio.
enum information
enum Sources . . .
enum Machines . .
enum Actions . . .
/A(j) or the information feasible to source )
{information} Feasible[sources] = ...;
//S4(k) or the set of all actions that can be performed next on machine k
{Actions} S4 [Machines] = ...;
// value of each machine based on implied situation independent by the user
float+ value [Machines] = ...;
// Bandwidth required to obtain information i from source j on machine k
float+ Bandwidthcost [information, sources, Machines] = ...;
// The maximum bandwidth available for transferring
float+ BandwidthMax = ...;
// The amount of processing power required to extract information i from
// source j on machine k
float+ Processingcost [information, sources, Machines] = ...;
// The overall maximum amount of processing power available to the fusion
// system
float+ ProcessingMax = ...;
// The current threat value of machine k
float+ Threat [Machines] = ...;
// A veryK very, very small number
float+ Epsilon = ...;
// The ability of information i from source j to detect action 1
float+ Detect [information, sources, Actions] = ...;
// The variable x(i,j,k) which is a binary decision variable
// The variable = 1 if information i will be obtained from source
// j on machine k
var int+ x[i in information, j in sources, k in Machines] in 0..1;
Figure 26 - OPLModel Declarations
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// objective of process refinement is to maximize the value of the
// information obtained
maximize
sum(k in Machines, j in sources, i in Feasible[j]) value[k]*x[i, j, k]
subject to
{
//can't exceed the maximum bandwidth
sum(k in Sharing[h], i in information, j in sources)
Bandwidthcost[i, j,k]*x[i, j,k] <= BandwidthMax;
//can't exceed the overall processing power available to Fusion
sum(i in information, j in Sources, k in Machines)
Processingcost [i, j,k]*x[i, j,k] <= processingMax;
//do not take information from machines with no threat
forallCi in information, j in sources, k in Machines)
xM.j.k] <= Threat [k] + 1 - Epsilon;
//Don't take info that will not help detect next possible actions
forall(i in information, j in sources, k in Machines)
x[i,j,k] <= sum(l in S4[k]) Detect [i,j,l];
Figure 27 - OPL Mathematical Model
This model accepts data for constant model parameters such as bandwidth and processing
costs as well as variable inputs like the value parameters and the S4k subsets. An example was
created consisting of a small sample network and a series of situations which could be modeled
as input to the Process Refinement model. The sample network is shown in Figure 25.
In this network, there are three external machines: Web Server, FTP Server and Email
Server. On the internal network, there are file and database servers as well as administrative and
client machines. This provides a wide variety of types ofmachines that an attacker could target.
In addition, the spectrum ofmachine importance is also very broad. Table 5 defines the situation
independent value of each machine (scale of 1-10).
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Web Server FTP Server Email Server
Firewall
Web Admin Subnet File Server Internal Database Dbase Admin 1 Dbase Admin 2
Client 1 Client 2 Client 3
Figure 28 - Sample Network




a> (0 * fN










<a> IS CO a ^~ (N CD
m go < a> C a> <x> ^_ +.* *-c (0 (0 c C C
-Q Q_ -Q -Q cu (0 CO a> CO <u
* LU * 300 c .2a .aa O O O
Value (v) 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.3
69
As each new situation arises, the values can change based on the calculated threat values.
These threat values would be obtained from Level 3: Threat Assessment of the information
fusion process but for purposes of this example, the threat value is an assumed value and not
directly calculated. The resulting value at each situation can be a combination of the threat level
of the machine and the situation independent value.
Although all of the model data can be variable, some model data is constant from
situation to situation for a given example. This data includes the bandwidth cost matrix, the
bandwidth maximum, the processing cost matrix, the processing cost maximum, epsilon and the
detectionmatrix. The situation constant data as input into the model for the example is shown in
Table 6 and Figure 26.
// Enumerations
information = { Recon, int, Esc, Goal };
Sources = { snort, sysLog };
Machines = { webserver, FTPServer, Email Server, WebAdmin,
subnetFileserver, internalDatabase, DbaseAdminl,
DbaseAdmin2, clientl, client 2, client 3 };
Actions = { ReconFPrint, ReconEnum, ReconSniff, Reconscan, intrusionRoot,
intrusionuser, pescos, PEscservice, GoalPilf, GoalBD, GoalDos };
Feasible = [{ Recon, int, Goal },{ Recon, int, Esc, Goal }] ;
Figure 29 - Situation Constant Data
To test the Process Refinement system, a typical cyber attack was developed and the
parameters of Process Refinement at each stage were estimated. The attack began with
reconnaissance, an intrusion, and ultimately a goal ofdenial of service on the Web Server. After
attacking the Web Server, the attack moves to the Internal Database with a reconnaissance
action, followed by a privilege escalation.
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Table 6 - Situation Constant Data
1 Bandwidth Cost
Recon Intrusion Escalation Goal
Snort SysLog Snort SysLog Snort SysLog Snort SysLog
Webserver 2 1 3 2 2 2
FTPServer 2 1 2 1 1 1
EmailServer 2 1 3 2 2 2
WebAdmin 1 1 1 1 1
SubnetFileServer 1 2 2 2 2
InternalDatabase 1 3 3 3 3
DbaseAdminl 1 1 1 1
DbaseAdmin2 1 1 1 1
Clientl 1 1 1 1
Client2 1 1 1 1
Client3 1 1 1 1
Processing Cost
Webserver 5 3 3 3 5 5 5 5
FTPServer 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
EmailServer 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WebAdmin 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3
SubnetFileServer 2 1 1 1 4 2 4 2
InternalDatabase 3 2 2 2 5 2 5 2
DbaseAdminl 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
DbaseAdmin2 1 1 1 3 3 3 3
Clientl 1 1 1 3 3 3 3
Client2 1 1 1 3 3 3 3
Clients 1 1 1 3 3 3 3
Detectable Actions
ReconFPrint 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ReconEnum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ReconSniff 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ReconScan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IntrusionRoot 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
IntrusionUser 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
PEscOS 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
PEscService 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
GoalPilf 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
GoalBD 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
GoalDoS 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Sinqle Values
BandwidthMax = 30
Processing Max = 30
Epsilon = 0.00000000001
The initial run of the test system was based on a situation in which no problems were
occurring. In this situation, the value of all machines was zero because the threat to all machines
was zero. The S4k subsets were all empty because there were no actions against the network
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taking place. The case of zero values was a trivial case but necessary to ensure that the test
system was working correctly. As suspected, the decision variables indicated that no
information should be obtained from any source because there is no situation. The zero values
case proved that the model performed properly under trivial conditions. Aside from testing, the
system should be set up such that if no situation is occurring, machines on the external network
have a threat value greater than zero. By making machines on the external network threatened,
the system will be able to detect attacks when they begin.
The first situation run performed with meaningful data was designed to resemble an
initial reconnaissance attack that an attacker might do to gain further information about the
network. The data in Table 7 was used for input for the situation variable inputs of the test
model.
It can be seen from this data that the values and threat for all internal machines remains
zero at this point because an intrusion has not yet occurred on the external network. The S4k
subset defines the next actions that could potentially occur. The resulting resource allocation
obtained from the test model using the data above is shown in Table 8.
The model obtained all of the resource allocation that it could, based on the constraints
present. From the information in the S4k subset, the model determined that the only actions that
can occur next on the FTP Server and Email Server are reconnaissance attacks. As such, the
model obtained resources on these machines pertaining to reconnaissance only. The model
obtained many information sources from the Web Server. Information from Snort pertaining to
Escalation types of information was not obtained because Escalation information is not in the
Fsnort subset defined in the constant values section of the data input. Reconnaissance information
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from SysLog was not obtained because SysLog's reconnaissance type information is not able to
detect any of the actions from the S4websener subset.
Table 7 - Model Input after First Reconnaissance
Value Threat S4k
Webserver 0.5 1 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum, IntrusionUser, PEscService,
IntrusionRoot. GoalBD. GoalPilf. GoalDoS
FTPServer 0.5 1 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum






Client 1 0.3 0
Client 2 0.3 0
Client 3 0.3 0
Table 8 - Model Recommendation after First Reconnaissance
Snort SysLog

























The next attack step tested was an initial intrusion on an external machine. The Web
Server was attacked once again, this time with an intrusion exploit. The data in Table 9 was used
for input to the test model.
Table 9 - Model Input after Intrusion
Value Threat S4k
Webserver 0.5 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum, IntrusionUser, PEscService,
IntmsionRoot. GoalBD. GoalPilf. GoalDoS
FTPServer 0.5 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
EmailServer 0.5 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
WebAdmin 0.4 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
SubnetFileServer 0.6 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
Inter a 1Database 0.9 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
DbaseAdminl 0.6 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
DbaseAdmin2 0.6 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
Client 1 0.3 0
Client 2 0.3 0
Client 3 0.3 0
When intrusions occur on the external network, internal network resources now become
vulnerable to attack. As a result, there are a number ofmachines which are now threatened and
have value and threat scores. However, at this stage, only reconnaissance attacks are expected
on the internal machines as is reflected in the S4k subsets. The results from the test model run
are displayed in Table 10.
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Table 10 - Model Recommendation after Intrusion
Snort SvsLoq
Recon Int Esc Goal Recon Int Esc Goal

























As suggested above, all internal machines one level below the external machines are now
threatened by reconnaissance. As such, the model has chosen to monitor reconnaissance
information on all of the machines that are threatened. As the value of the Web Server remained
the highest value of all machines, all of the information obtained for the Web Server during the
previous situation was obtained again.
Following a typical attack progression, the next situation to occur was a goal ofdenial of
service on the Web Server. The data in Table 1 1 was used for input for the denial of service
situation. The main point of interest with this set of data is that the actions in the S4k subsets
have not changed for this situation. The actions in the subsets have not changed because
achieving a goal does not necessarily provide the attacker any additional knowledge to use in
penetrating the network further. Usually, goal actions occur at the end of an attack progression
when the attacker is finished penetrating the network. Other possible goals actions besides
denial of service include file pilfering and installing backdoors. The results from the denial of
service scenario are shown in Table 12.
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Table 11 - Model Input after Denial of Service
Value Threat S4k
Webserver 0.5 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum, IntrusionUser, PEscService,
IntrusionRoot. GoalBD. GoalPilf. GoalDoS
FTPServer 0.5 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
EmailServer 0.5 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
WebAdmin 0.4 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
SubnetFileServer 0.6 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
IntemalDatabase 0.9 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
DbaseAdminl 0.6 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
DbaseAdmin2 0.6 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
Client 1 0.3 0
Client 2 0.3 0
Client 3 0.3 0
Table 12 - Model Recommendation after Denial of Service
Snort SvsLoq
Recon Int Esc Goal Recon Int Esc Goal
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Since the attacker gained no additional knowledge for network penetration in performing
a denial of service, the S4k subset values did not change. As a result, the system did not obtain
information from any additional sources than the previous situation. Had the S4k subsets
changed, then additional data may have been obtained. If the S4k subsets do not change,
different information can only be obtained by significant changes in value of the machines. As
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the web server has been continually attacked and no new machines threatened, the recommended
information to obtain does not change.
Now that the attacker has compromised a machine completely on the external network,
they may decide to continue attacking machines on the external network or try to penetrate the
internal network. As most external networks do not contain the types of information that hackers
often attack networks to obtain, a penetration of the internal network is more likely. As such,
hackers may attempt to perform reconnaissance on an internal machine or subnet to try to learn
more about the information contained on the internal network and the security which protects the
network resources containing the information. The data shown in Table 13 was used for input
for a reconnaissance attack on the internal database.
Table 13 - Model Input after Second Reconnaissance
Value Threat S4k
Webserver 0.5 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum, IntrusionUser, PEscService,
IntrusionRoot, GoalBD. GoalPilf, GoalDoS
FTPServer 0.5 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
EmailServer 0.5 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
WebAdmin 0.4 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
SubnetFileServer 0.6 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
IntemalDatabase 0.9 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum, IntrusionUser, PEscService,
IntrusionRoot. GoalBD. GoalPilf. GoalDoS
DbaseAdminl 0.6 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum, IntrusionUser, PEscService,
IntrusionRoot. GoalBD. GoalPilf. GoalDoS
DbaseAdmin2 0.6 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum, IntrusionUser, PEscService,
IntrusionRoot. GoalBD. GoalPilf. GoalDoS
Client 1 0.3 0
Client 2 0.3 0
Client 3 0.3 0
Once a reconnaissance attack has occurred on a subnet in the internal network, machines
connected to the machine that has been attacked are threatened. Thus, when the reconnaissance
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attack occurred on the internal database, Dbase Admin 1 and Dbase Admin 2 are also threatened.
This causes the list of actions in the S4DbaSeAdmini and S4DbaseAdmin2 subsets to expand into all
possible actions because they are on the same level as the internal database. The resulting
recommendation for this situation is shown in Table 14.
Table 14 - Model Recommendation after Second Reconnaissance
Snort SysLog
Recon Int Esc Goal Recon Int Esc Goal
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At this point, the recommendations are vastly different between the situation when the
internal network was not penetrated and the situation when the internal network has been
penetrated. At this point, the bandwidth and processing constraints begin limiting the number of
network resources that information can be obtained from. The values for many of the internal
machines are intrinsically higher than the external machines so now that the internal machines
are compromised, the overall values of the internal machines becomes higher than most of the
external machines. As a result, the network resources which information will be obtained from
will lean more towards those resources that can obtain information about the internal machines
than external.
Now that the attacker has gained some information about the internal database, the
attacker would more than likely try to exploit this machine with the information that they have
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obtained. The data used to create a privilege escalation attack on the internal database is shown
in Table 15.
Table 15 - Model Input after Privilege Escalation
Value Threat S4k
Webserver 0.5 1 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum, IntrusionUser, PEscService,
IntrusionRoot. GoalBD. GoalPilf. GoalDoS
FTPServer 0.5 1 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
EmailServer 0.5 1 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
WebAdmin 0.4 1 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
SubnetFileServer 0.6 1 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
IntemalDatabase 0.9 1 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum, IntrusionUser, PEscService,
IntrusionRoot. GoalBD. GoalPilf. GoalDoS
DbaseAdminl 0.6 1 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum, IntrusionUser, PEscService,
IntrusionRoot. GoalBD. GoalPilf. GoalDoS
DbaseAdmin2 0.6 1 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum, IntrusionUser, PEscService,
IntrusionRoot. GoalBD. GoalPilf. GoalDoS
Client 1 0.3 1 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
Client 2 0.3 1 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
Client 3 0.3 1 ReconFPrint, ReconEnum
The main difference in the data input for the reconnaissance attack and the data input for
the privilege escalation is that the values of the machines have changed. The web server has not
been attacked recently and the attacker appears to be attacking the internal network so there is
less need for network resources on the external network. The result is that the internal database
and the two machines connected to it have the highest value of any machines in the network.
The data in Table 16 shows the results from the privilege escalation situation.
The maximum amount of detection resources have been obtained to detect attacks on the
internal database, Dbase Admin 1 and Dbase Admin 2 because these resources have the highest
value. The remaining capacity for processing and bandwidth is allocated to Web Admin, Subnet
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File Server and the Web Server because they all have the same value. At this point, the shift in
detection focus from external to internal has been reached.
Table 16 - Model Recommendation after Privilege Escalation
Snort SysLog
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As the attacker penetrates deeper into the network, the system will continue to project
their activities forward, allowing the system administrator to identify their progress until the
attacker's access to the network can be eliminated. Projecting the attacker's actions forward
allows the system administrator to easily track intruders by using the resources that provide
maximum value based on the current situation. As a result, the system administrator can spend
more time trying to remove the attacker from the network than spending valuable time trying to
keep up with the attacker as the attacker progresses through the network.
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6. Evaluation of Process Refinement Performance
By using an example network and attack scenario, Process Refinement has demonstrated
the ability to track attacks as they propagate through a network by taking advantage of the most
valuable of detection resources to the current situation. However, the question remains of how
Process Refinement performs against other methods of detection. The power of Process
Refinement is the ability to alter detection points based on the current situation rather than
obtaining data in a static manner. Thus, tests were conducted to evaluate Process Refinement
against a series of static scenarios in order to measure and evaluate the benefits of using the
Process Refinement system.
In order for the analysis to be unbiased, the simulation model presented in section four
was used to create attack scenarios with accompanying noise. The automatic attack generation
methodology was used to generate the attacks to remove any bias caused by user input. A series
of random static detection scenarios were generated to test against the Process Refinement
system.
6.1 Test System Setup
The purpose of testing Process Refinement against static scenarios was to show the
benefit of Process Refinement's ability to adjust network detection to changing situations in a
network. Therefore, for the purposes of this test, the types of information gathered were not as
important as where and when they were gathered from. In order to keep the test simple yet still
able to show the benefits ofProcess Refinement, one type of information was gathered from two
different information sources. The type of information was alerts and the two sources shall be
named sensor one and sensor two.
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6.1.1 Network Topology and Information Definition
To further show the benefit of Process Refinement, the detection abilities of sensor one
and sensor two were defined differently. Sensor one was defined as a reconnaissance detecting
sensor and sensor two was defined as an intrusion and goal detecting sensor. This was done to
illustrate Process Refinement's ability to not only base it's recommendation on which machines
could be threatened next but also on which actions could happen next as well. Thus, in this
particular example, if only reconnaissance style actions can happen next based on the current
situation, process refinement will only select sensor one.
The network that was created to use as a test system was designed to have many subnets
of varying size which attackers to penetrate. The network was also designed to have multiple
avenues into these subnets. The test network contains 33 total machines, some servers and some
workstations, and a clearly defined internal and external network. A diagram of the network
created is shown in Figure 27.
To determine the total amount of information that could be collected in the example
network, estimates were obtained from subject matter experts as to how much information could
be obtained on a network if network sensors were located at each node of the network. An
estimate of 2,000 alerts arriving per second from all network detection resources was used for
this test. Secondly, subject matter experts also supplied estimates for the number of alerts that
could be processed by a fusion engine. The estimate used for this parameter was 1 ,000 alerts per
second. Thus, although the network would have 2,000 alerts arriving per second if all
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Figure 30 - Test Network
Although the network used in this test system is far smaller than the networks obtaining
2,000 alerts per second, a similar proportion for the amount of information that can be gathered
was used. The total amount of information that can be gathered in the example network was 66
pieces of information, two sensors on each of 33 machines. Following the proportion given by
the subject matter experts, half of this amount, or 33 pieces of information can be obtained for
the purposes of this example.
To create the detection schemes to test against Process Refinement, a random generation
method was used. The machine to collect information from was chosen at random and the
sensor that would be used was also selected randomly. A total of 33 unique machine/sensor
combinations were generated for each detection scheme. Five total detection schemes were
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created to test against Process Refinement. Diagrams for the detection schemes can be seen in
Appendix I.
6.1.2 Testing Setupfor Process Refinement
To evaluate a situation with Process Refinement, several parameters of the system needed
to be defined. To ensure that Process Refinement could only obtain up to 33 pieces of
information, the bandwidth and processing constraints of the system were set so that each piece
of information gathered would cost one unit for each constraint and the maximum level for each
constraint was 33. The actions that could be detected by the different sensors also needed to be
defined and as mentioned previously, sensor one was set to recognize reconnaissance style
actions and sensor two could recognize all other actions. The value of each machine also had to
be defined. Table 17 shows the assignment of values. Highest value was given to internal
network servers, then internal network workstations and finally to external network servers.
Table 17 - Value Assignement
Machine Value Machine Value Machine Value
1 L 02 L_ 13 0.8 25 0.6
2 0.2 14 0.8 26 0.6
3 0.2 15 0.9 27 0.6
4 0.1 16 0.5 28 0.6
5 0.1 17 0.5 29 0.9
6 0.1 18 0.5 30 0.4
7 0.3 19 0.5 31 0.4
8 0.3 20 0.5 32 0.7
9 0.9 21 0.5 33 0.7
10 0.9 22 0.9
11 0.8 23 0.6
12 0.8 24 0.6
In addition to static input, process refinement contains two parameters whose input varies
based on the situation. These parameters are threat and next possible actions. Each machine
receives a threat score and set of next possible actions. The threat score is a one or zero
parameter in which threat is equal to one if a machine is compromised or one machine away
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from a compromised machine. Threat is equal to zero in all other cases. The set of next possible
actions on a machine is determined by evaluating the actions that have occurred and consulting a
graph-based template similar to the one discussed in section 4.2. For the purpose of this
example, the graph-based template used is from Mathew et al. (2005).
6. 1. 3 Attack Scenarios andEvaluation Metrics
To fully test the Process Refinement system, attack situations were created in a variety of
ways. The first stage of the test was used to evaluate Process Refinement's performance as only
a single attack is run against the network. The second stage becomes much more complicated as
several coinciding attacks are run against the network at once. To remove bias from the analysis,
all attack scenarios were created using the simulation model presented in section 4 with the
automatic attack generation methodology highlighted in section 4.2.
In the first stage where only one attack was occurring at a time, attacks were designed to
penetrate to deep levels of the network. Penetrating to the deepest levels of the network was
done to show Process Refinement's ability to track an attack as it progresses. These attacks were
assigned varying parameters for efficiency and stealth so some attacks are short and to the point
while others take a little more time. Five different attacks were created and each can be seen in
Appendix J.
The second stage of the test was done to show how Process Refinement makes decisions
on what information to gather when not all information can be gathered. With multiple attacks
occurring at one time at different parts of the network, Process Refinement was forced to manage
the detection resources more strictly to ensure that the highest value machines were being
monitored. Five attack scenarios were generated for this stage as well and can be seen in
Appendix K.
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The primary measurement used to evaluate the detection schemes at stage one of the test
was the percent of attack steps recognized. The reason that percent of steps recognized was
chosen as the primary metrics was because stage one evaluated Process Refinement's ability to
track an entire attack through the network. The primary measurement used at stage two of the
test was the sum of the value of the machines on which attack steps were detected. These
metrics were used to evaluate Process Refinement's ability to obtain information from the most
valuable of threatened sources.
6.2 SingleAttack Scenarios
Stage one of the test consisted of single attacks run against the sample network.
Designed to show the power of Process Refinement in tracking attacks through a network, the
primary performance metric for this stage was the percent of attack steps recognized.
6.2.1 Random Scenario Results
As discussed in section 6.1.1, several random detection scenarios were generated to
evaluate against Process Refinement. Each attack generated was compared to each random
detection scheme created and the detection scheme's ability to detect each step of each attack
noted. In addition, the machines that were compromised in each attack were examined to
determine if any detection information was collected. The percent of machines compromised
with information sources collected versus the total number of machines compromised in the
attack was a secondary metric. The results from stage one of the test for the randomly generated
detection schemes is shown in Table 18.
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N N N N Y N N N N N N N Y N N Y N N Y N Y N Y N Y
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t
N N Y N N Y N N Y N Y N Y N Y
N N Y N N Y N N Y N N N Y N Y
Y N N N N N Y Y N N
Y N N N N N Y Y N N
.
N Y Y N N
N Y Y N N
N Y Y N N
Total Found 2 1 3 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 8 1 4 3 2 2 5 2 6 6 11 2 6
Percentage 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.5 08 0.2 0.5
Average 0.286 0.233 0.340 0.350 0477
Total Avg 0.337
P/C Percent 0.2 0.2 '0.4 0.2 0.4 03 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 r0 .8 0 3 '0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0 5 0 5 0.4 0 4 r0 8 0.4 0.6
Average 0.280 0.333 0.450 0.400 0520
Total Avg 0.397
The table shows each random detection scheme's ability to detect each step of each attack
based on the randomly assigned information gathering sources. A
"Y" in a box indicates that the
attack step was detected and an
"N" in a box indicates the attack step was not detected. The total
number of attack steps detected by the detection scheme is listed in the row labeled "Total
Found." The percentage of the attack steps that were found is shown in the next row down
labeled "Percentage." The average percent of attack steps detected across all detection schemes
for a given attack scenario is shown in the next row labeled "Average." The row labeled "Total
Average"
shows the average detection percentage across all detection schemes and attack
scenarios. The secondary metric of compromised machines with information sources gathered





for Protected/Compromised. The average of the "P/C
Percent"
metrics for a given detection
scheme is shown in the next row labeled
"Average." Lastly, the next row labeled "Total
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Average"
shows the average detection percentage across all detection schemes and all attack
scenarios.
The data in the table shows that even the highest detection percent average, the average
for attack five, has only 47% of attack steps detected on average with other attack scenarios in
the range of 30%. In addition, the average value of "P/C Percent" for each attack scenario is
highest for attack scenario five but only with a value of 52%. The results from the first stage of
the test with the random detection schemes indicate that using a random detection scheme will at
best detect only halfof the attack actions occurring against the network with the average number
of steps detected around 30%.
6.2.2 Process Refinement Recommendations
To determine the recommendation from Process Refinement for a given situation, two
parameters needed to be defined for each machine in the network: threat and next possible
actions. As the situation changes in the network due to proliferating attacks, the threat to
machines and the next possible actions that can occur on those machines changes. The first thing
that had to be done to run Process Refinement was to find out at one points in time the
parameters of Process Refinement would change, triggering a recommendation to be generated.
Running the system under equal parameters would not change the recommendation. Thus, the
points in time at which the parameters of Process Refinement would change needed to be
determined for each attack scenario. Table 19 describes the points in time when the parameters
ofProcess Refinement would change for each attack.
The table shows the points in time at which the parameters ofProcess Refinement change
and thus, the recommendation made by Process Refinement has the potential to change. A
"C"




was executed. Thus, Process Refinement would give a
recommendation after the attack step executed and would be valid for all attack steps subsequent
until another recommendation was made.
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At attack step zero, or the point in time before the first step of the attack occurs, there are
no attacks occurring against the network. At any such time, threats to machines on the internal
network are assumed to be zero and threats to the machines on the external network are assumed
to be one. The set of next possible actions for machines on the internal network is assumed to
empty and the set of next possible actions for external network machines is assumed to be
actions from stage zero of the graph-based template.
As attack steps occur, the parameters of Process Refinement change and a new
recommendation can be made. For example, when attack step one of the first attack, a
reconnaissance action, occurs, the threat values stay the same because the attack can not
technically penetrate the internal network until an intrusion occurs. However, the set of next
possible actions is updated because an intrusion or goal action could occur next on the external
machines. Thus, Process Refinement can provide a recommendation because the next possible
actions parameter has changed. Similarly, when attack step two of attack one occurs, this time
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an intrusion, both the threat and next actions parameters are updated and Process Refinement can
make a new recommendation. The recommendations made at each point indicated in Table 19
can be seen in Appendix L.
A similar results table to the one shown in section 6.2.1 was generated for the
recommendations given by Process Refinement as well. The results for Process Refinement can
be seen in Table 20. This table shows that Process Refinement was able to track each attack as it
traveled through the network, detecting every step of each attack for a 100%> detection average.
As a result, each machine compromised was protected by some information gathering resource
for a "P/C Percent" average of 100% as well.
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6.2.3 Comparison ofRandom Detection to Process Refinement Detection
Table 2 1 shows the results of all random detection schemes and the results from Process
Refinement together. The data in the table shows that Process Refinement system was much
better equipped to detect the attack actions of each attack as the attacks propagated through the
network. Process Refinement was also much better at protecting machines that ended up being
compromised.
Table 21 - Results for Random Detection and Process Refinement
Random Process Refinement
Total Average Percent 0.337 1.000
Total Average P/C Percent 0.397 1.000
The first stage of the test was designed to show that when Process Refinement is not
forced to choose between detection resources, it has the ability to track single attacks throughout
their entirety. The next stage of the test will investigate Process Refinement's performance when
multiple attacks are occurring in the network at once.
6.3 MultipleAttack Scenarios
Stage two of the test consisted ofmultiple attacks occurring against the network at once.
Stage two was designed to show that Process Refinement will obtain information for the highest
valued network resources in a resource constrained situation. Again, the random detection
schemes described in 6.1.1 were compared to detection schemes recommended by Process
Refinement for each multiple attack scenario.
6. 2. 1 Random Scenario Results
In stage two of the test, the random detection schemes were once again evaluated to
determine their performance. At this stage, the primary metric was the sum of the Process
Refinement value of compromised machines on which detection information was gathered. The
metrics from stage one, percent of attack steps recognized and percent of compromised machines
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protected, were gathered at stage two as well. The results for the random detection schemes can
be seen in Table 22.
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16 N N N N Y N N Y N N Y Y N N Y N Y Y N N Y N N N N
17 N N N N Y
i
Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N N N N Y Y Y
18 Y N N N Y N N N Y N N N N N Y N N N N N
19 Y Y N N Y Y N Y N Y N N N N Y N N Y N N
20 N N N N Y N N Y N Y N N N N Y N N Y N N
21 Y N N N Y N Y Y N N N N N N Y N N N N Y
22 N N N N Y N N Y N Y N N N N Y N N N N Y
23 Y N N Y Y N N Y N Y Y Y N N Y
24 Y N N Y Y Y Y N N Y
Value Sum 3.4 08 2.0 0.8 3.2 0.7 0.9 1.2 0.9 1.2 2.8 2.1 5.2 16 3.9 3.0 16 3.6 1.0 4.0 2.6 14 2.1 1.7 3.3
Value % 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 06 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.4 02 0.3 03 05
Average 0.352 0.265 0.376 0.347 0.342
Total Avg 0.336
Table 22 shows the results from comparing each multiple attack scenario to the random
detection schemes to determine which attack steps would be recognized. The individual attacks
and steps are not distinguished in this table for simplicity but can be found in Appendix K. At
each time step, a new attack step occurs from one of the three attacks. A
"Y" in the box
indicates that the attack step was detected and an
"N" indicates that the attack step was not
detected. The row labeled "Value Sum" shows the sum of the Process Refinement values of
each machine that was compromised on which information was gathered. The row labeled
"Value %" shows the "Value
Sum" divided by the sum of the values of all compromised
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machines in the particular multiple attack scenario. The next row labeled "Average" shows the
average of the "Value %" statistic across all random detection schemes. The row labeled "Total
Average"
shows the average of the "Value %" across all detection schemes and all attack
scenarios. The metrics from the first stage of the test were also collected as secondary metrics
and can be seen in Table 23.
Table 23 - Results for Random Detection Stage 2 SecondaryMetrics
Attack Scenario 1 Attack Scenario 2 Attack Scenario 3 Attack Scenario 4 Attack Scenario 5
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
Total Found 8 3 9 4 13 3 4 9 6 8 8 9 12 4 15 6 7 11 2 14 8 6 10 7 12
Percentage 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.6 04 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.5
Averaqe 0.308 0.375 0.417 0.333 0.391
Total Avg 0.365
P/C Ratio 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.6 '0.3 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.5[rj.2 0.5 0.5 04 04 0.4 0.6
Average 0.400 0.371 0.417 0.382 0.471
Total Avg 0.408
Tables 22 and 23 show that in multiple attack scenarios, the random detection schemes
still only obtain about 33% of the available important information on average. The percentage of
the value of compromised machines obtained is highest when looking at attack scenario three but
the detection schemes can still only obtain 37% of the total value compromised. Additionally,
the random detection schemes were able to detect at best 47% of the attack steps with an average
of 36% of attack steps found. Finally, the random detection schemes were able to obtain
information from at best 47% of compromised machines with an average of41%.
6.2.2 Process Refinement Recommendations
In order for Process Refinement to run, the two main parameters of Process Refinement
needed to be defined for each distinct situational change in time. The two parameters were threat
and next possible actions and each parameter needed to be defined for each machine. The points
during each attack where the situation changes in terms of Process Refinement input are shown
in Table 24.
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The points at which a Process Refinement recommendation would occur are indicated in
the table by a "C" in the box. It is important to note that a "C" indicates that a recommendation
will be created based on the data from the step corresponding to the particular
"C."
Thus, the
step directly after a "C" and any other steps through the next point at which a recommendation
will occur in the attack scenario will be monitored by the recommendation given at the point of
the "C". For example, when step three of the attack scenario Ml occurs, it initiates a Process
Refinement recommendation as indicated by the "C" in the box forMl and step three. Step four,
five, and six will all be monitored by the recommendation initiated at three. Once six is
complete however, a new recommendation is necessary as indicated by the "C" in the box
corresponding to Ml and step six. This new recommendation will be responsible for monitoring
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step seven, and so on. The recommendations created for each of the points shown in table 24 can
be found in Appendix M.
Process Refinement's performance with multiple attacks occurring in the network at once
is shown in Table 25. The table shows that Process Refinement was able to obtain on average
97% of the total value of compromised machines and in attack scenario two, Process Refinement
was able to obtain 100% of the value of compromised machines.
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The metrics from stage one of the test were evaluated for Process Refinement in stage
two as well and are shown in Table 26. Table 26 shows that Process Refinement was able to
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detect on average 93% of the attack steps in all attack scenarios. Process Refinement was also
able to obtain information from 92% ofcompromised machines.
Table 26 - Process Refinement Results Stage 2 Secondary Metrics
Process Refinement
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
Total Found 23 16 22 22 19
Percentage 0.96 1.00 0.96 0.92 0.86
Average !
Total Avg 0.939
P/C Ratio 0.90 1.00 0.92 0.91 0.86
Average :
Total Avg 0.917
6.2.3 Comparison ofRandom Detection to Process RefinementDetection
Table 27 shows the averages of the performance metrics for the random detection
schemes and Process Refinement across all attack scenarios. The table shows that Process
Refinement is superior to random detection across all performance metrics. Process Refinement
obtains more of the percent value of compromised machines, detects attack steps at a greater
percentage rate, and obtains information from compromised machines at a greater percentage
rate as well.








However, a major difference between the results from stage one and the results from
stage two is that Process Refinement did not perform perfect in stage two as it did in stage one.
Process Refinement is not a perfect system and is still confronted by the fact that not all network
resources can be obtained. Missed attack steps are bound to occur especially as the breadth of
attacks and number of attacks increases. The next section of the test describes some of the
limitations ofProcess Refinement.
96
6.4 Process Refinement Failure
Although Process Refinement is excellent at tracking a single attack through a network
and obtaining highest value information when confronted with constraints, situations exist in
which Process Refinement will fail. This section highlights the situations in which Process
Refinement can fail and describes why the failures occur.
6.4.1 Failure Reasons
The reason that Process Refinement can fail is because the network has far more
information than Process Refinement can choose to obtain. Tradeoffs are forced to be made as
more attacks occur and as the size of the network grows, the number of these tradeoffs that
Process Refinement must make grows as well. Process Refinement decides between equally
threatened machines by examining the value specified for trie machines. Higher value machines
have a higher obtainment priority than lower value machines. Thus, at some point, a newly
threatened high value machine may take the place of a still threatened but lower value machine.
As a result, the specification of the value of the machines is extremely important to
Process Refinement's effectiveness. Some analysts may choose to specify their external
machines as highest value to ensure that all attacks are recognized when they start. The problem
with this method is that once the attack proceeds into the network, detection resources may not
be available to track the attack because they are assigned to the higher value external machines.
Other analysts might choose to place the highest value on machines on the internal network.
Unfortunately, placing highest value on internal machines may prevent these analysts from
recognizing attacks when they begin in the network, making the attacks harder to track.
Whatever the analysts decision, at some point in time, an attack step can be missed. The
best allocation of value is hard to determine empirically and should more likely be based on
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specific networks with unique attributes and qualities. The following example illustrates the
problem with value assignment.
6.4.2 Example ofFailure
To show the potential for failure in Process Refinement, an example attack scenario has
been created. This attack scenario consists of three different attacks, each targeting a different
machine in the network. The example network described for the first two stages of testing is
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Figure 31 TargetedMachines
The machine on the left and the machine in the middle were chosen because attacking
thosemachines would result in a large number ofmachines threatened. The machine on the right
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was chosen because it was on the opposite side of the network from the other two machines. The
attack scenario was setup so that the attacks targeting the left and middle machine shown above
would execute at the same time. The attack targeting the machine on the right was delayed so
that the attack would not start until the first two attacks were almost complete. As a result, when
the third attack begins, there are already a large amount ofmachines threatened in the network.
Formore detailed information about the attack scenario, refer to Appendix N.
This attack scenario was designed so that detection resources could be completely
allocated to detecting and tracking actions occurring in the first two attacks when the third attack
starts. To ensure that detection resources will be allocated in this manner, the values needed to
be defined in a specific way. The value assignments are shown in Table 28.
Table 28 - Value Assignment
Machine Value Machine Value Machine Value
1 0.5 13 0.6 25 0.7
2 0.5 14 0.6 26 0.7
3 0.5 15 0.9 27 0.7
4 0.2 16 0.8 28 0.7
5 0.2 17 0.8 29 0.3
6 0.2 18 0.8 30 0.1
7 0.4 19 0.8 31 0.1
8 0.4 20 0.8 32 0.1
9 0.9 21 0.8 33 0.1
10 0.9 22 0.9
11 0.6 23 0.7 .
12 0.6 24 0.7
The table shows that the values are assigned such that machines on the left branch of the
network are much higher in value than machines on the right side of the network. This results in
machines on the left side of the network having priority over machines on the right side of the
network. As the first two attacks target machines on the left side of the network, these machines
will become threatened first and detection resources will allocated accordingly by Process
Refinement. When the third attack begins to penetrate the right side of the network, the
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machines on the right side of the network will become threatened. However, since the machines
on the right side of the network are lower in value, no information will be obtained from them,
resulting in the entire third attack going undetected. Table 29 shows the points in time at which
Process Refinement made a recommendation, the attack and step that occur at that point, and
whether the step was detected or not.
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This table shows that Process Refinement made a recommendation at points one, three,
four, and five in order to track the first two attacks as the attacks progressed through the network.
These recommendations can be seen in Appendix N. However, when the third attack began,
Process Refinement did not even make a recommendation because no detection resources were
allocated to right side of the network. Therefore, no change to the Process Refinement
parameters occurred because the entire system did not detect any of the actions at the start of
attack three. In this particular case, even if the beginning of attack three had been detected,
Process Refinement's recommendation would not change because Process Refinement would
already be obtaining information from the highest valuemachines.
The miss of an entire attack in an attack scenario can be considered a critical failure of
Process Refinement. This example illustrates how sensitive Process Refinement is to the
assignment ofvalue and the resulting importance that the assignment ofvalue should have.
6.5 Testing Conclusions
This test has shown that Process Refinement has a better ability to detect and track attack
steps as single attacks progress through a network than random detection schemes. The test has
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also shown that in the same single attack case, Process Refinement will obtain information from
far more compromised machines than random detection schemes. As more attacks occur in the
network at the same time, Process Refinement still has the ability to detect far more of the attack
steps than a random detection scheme and additionally, Process Refinement obtains information
from machines with high value with a much higher percentage than random detection schemes.
However, as was shown in section 6.4, Process Refinement is not a perfect system and
attack steps will be missed at times. In extreme circumstances, Process Refinement may even
miss all steps of an entire attack but this is rare and highly dependant on user specified Process
Refinement parameters. Although Process Refinement maymiss entire attacks, the highest value
machines in the network as defined by the user will still be protected.
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7. Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Research
Hackers are a growing problem both due to the growing number that exist and the
increasing danger from their actions. However, even as hackers become more numerous and
more dangerous, technological advances continue to develop to thwart hackers (McClure,
Scambray, & Kurtz, 2001). Simulating the actions of hackers allows analysts to leam more
about how hackers act and behave, providing a better understanding of how to stop hackers.
Additionally, information fusion techniques provide analysts with better information that they
can act on when hackers attack their networks.
The simulation model presented using the automatic attack generation methodology is
designed to show analysts a number ofways that hackers can attack networks. In addition, these
automatically generated attacks can be used to test either network analysts or systems developed
to assist analysts in detecting, identifying, and tracking hacker attacks. Additional machine
attributes were added to the simulation model as well to assist in creating more realistic attacks.
Validation of the simulationmodel presented provides insurance that the conclusions drawn from
the simulation model results will have similar bearing in the real world.
Even though information fusion systems developed to assist network analysts improve
the analyst's ability to track hacker attacks, the amount of potentially valuable information in a
network is enormous and often far too much for a fusion system to handle. The Process
Refinement model presented allows the fusion system to focus on the most important data and is
adaptive to changing situations in the network. This adaptive nature allows the fusion system as
a whole to adapt and change as hacker behavior adapts and changes.
Additionally, the validated simulation model was used to test the presented Process
Refinement model to ensure that the Process Refinement model would be able to help the fusion
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system. The Process Refinement model exhibited the ability to detect and track single attacks
through a network and also to obtain information from the highest valued machines in a network
when faced with constrained detection resources. Through testing, the Process Refinement
model was shown to perform better than a number of random detection schemes generated across
multiple metrics ofperformance.
Testing also showed some sensitivity of the Process Refinement model to the
specification ofmachine value. A rare case was shown in which Process Refinement missed an
entire attack in a scenario where multiple attacks were occurring at once. However, Process
Refinement still obtained information from the highest valued machines as specified in the test
scenario.
To further develop the simulation model presented, the human-computer interface (HCI)
should be redesigned to streamline the attack specification process. Specifically, when creating a
simulated network, the number ofmodules that must be used in a model should be reduced by
using modules that represent entire groups of machines. Additionally, the user's control of the
attack action and alert definitions should be improved so that updates and changes can be made
quickly and easily. In the automatic attack generation methodology, additional measures of
hacker behavior beyond stealth and efficiency should be created in order to model a wider
variety of hacker attack scenarios. Finally, the automatic attack generation methodology should
be improved to allow for more depth in branches of an attack as described in section 4.2.3 and to
allow for more steps to be created in each attack.
Development of Process Refinement can take two separate branches. First, the existing
model can be improved to account for additional network constraints beyond bandwidth and
processing power. The existing model could also be improved by investigating further the
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sensitivity of value assignment to potentially determine a best case scenario for value
assignment. Testing of the existing model could also be continued to see how Process
Refinement performs as even more attacks are executed at the same time or how Process
Refinement performs when resources are constrained more heavily. The initial model could also
be tested against subject matter expert defined detection schemes rather than just random to
further identify the benefits ofProcess Refinement.
The second branch of development that Process Refinement could take is to examine
other areas of the fusion system that could be improved on a situational basis. The initial model
presented obtains information from fusion level three and acts to improve fusion level one:
Object Refinement where initial information detection is performed. As described in section 5.2,
there could be a number of other modules of Process Refinement that obtain information from
the fusion system and act to improve the fusion system's capabilities.
Improving both the simulation methodology presented and the Process Refinement
system can further help with the growing problem of hackers. Understanding hacker's behavior
and intent is a critical part of protecting a computer network. Additionally, obtaining
information in a manner that maximizes the value of the information and reduces the amount of
useless information that must be process can make the difference between catching the hacker
and allowing them to slip away.
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Shown below are screen shots from the original simulation model created for the AFRL
(Kuhl & Kistner, 2005). The screen shots included show the network building tools, backbone




Figure El - Network Template
Connector
Connector Name1 [Conneetc* 1
IDS
r Snort IDS
No. of Connections: JO
OK | Cancel | Help |
Figure E2 - Switch Information Box
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OK j Cancel | Heip |
Figure E3 - Machine Information Box
Create Attacks and Assign Properties
Create Assign VBA Assign FindJ
Assign Delay Route
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C Input scenario from file:
Format is: InputFfe_<Name of Scenario
Start









Figure E8 - Scenario File Display
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Welcome to the IDSSensor
AlertsSimulator
Scenario Name: Us* letters and rurtwi only. Sam
sDOOal characters art not recoonzed.
OetayDistrbution
Select random valet from an
exponential distribution
r Use constafit values
DelayMethod
p Input total time for attack and
split time up between steps
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Time to Run After Last
Attack is CompietB : 0
Run SknUattan
Figure E9 - Attack Generation Main Screen
Attack Specification*
Attack Name \ Attack l Use letters and numbers only. Sons
SOSOjSI characters are not recooneod.
How many steps would you




Source IP 1 Tj TargetlP
\~~
1.0 AcBon Successful - Go to Next Step
0 Acbcn Fais - So to Next Step
(0 < Probatory of Success < 1)
~3
F? Encode this step?Probabetyof
Success
f'
Action 1 zl Zl zl






Figure E10 - Attack Generation Add/Edit Attack
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Appendix B: OriginalSimulationModel - Attack Example
This section describes an attack example created using the original simulation
methodology generated for the AFRL (Kuhl & Kistner, 2005). Detailed below is the simulated
computer network that was created and the resulting data files created.
The computer network created using the Cyber Attack Simulator is shown in Figure II . A
summary of the network is as follows:
1 main web-server;
4 main subnet domains;
3 subnet domains have further subnets attached;
Only one external machine; and
Red dots indicate snort sensor presence
Figure Fl - Network Configuration
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Ed* Farm* view Hafc
-lot*!
Attack 1, step 1, Recon. Enumeration, web-frontpage users. pwd access, Encoded, 180.137.148.74, ->, |L00. 1.101. 1, Prob of success -, -JAttack 1, step 2, intrusion, user, WEB-CGI webdMver access, Encoded, 213.5.54.19, ->, 100.1.101.1, Prob of Success -, .9, ->, sue
Attack 1, step 3, Goal, Backdoor, backdoor typot troian traffic, Encoded, 204.39.152.244, ->, 100.1.101.1, Prob of success -, .8,
Attack 1, step 4. Recon, scanning, ICMP PING Microsoft windows, , 100.1.101.1, ->, 100.10.20.1, Prob of success -, .7, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, step 5, Intrusion, user, WEB-CGI MacMnelnfo access, , 100.1.101.1, ->, 100.10.20.1, Prob of success -, 1, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, step 6, Goal, Dos, ooos tfn client command be, Encoded, 100.1.101.1, ->, 100.10.20.1, Prob of success -, 1, ->, success














WEB-FRONTPAGE users.pwd access, ["")
, BACKDOOR typot . . _
ioip PING Microsoft windows
web-cgi MacMnelnfo access,




web-cgi webdMver access, .] [classi i ation: attempted-recon], [priority














Figure F2 - Ground Truth Files
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1:2079:4 RPC portmap nlockmgr request UDP [**] [Classification: rpc-portmap-decode] [pr1 ority: 2] \{udp\} T;
1:1958:4, RPC saoWnd TCP PING [*"] [classification: attempted-admin] [priority: 1] \{TCP\> 211.151.252.233
1:1829:4. web-misc Tomcat Troublesnooter servlet access [*] [classification: web-appl1cat1on-act1v1ty] [Pr
1:1730:4 web-cgi ustorekeeper.pl directory traversal attempt ["*] [classification: web-appl1cat1on-attack]
1:1414:4] snmp private access tcp [*] [classification: attempted-recon] [priority: 2] \{TCP\] 250.16.100.9-
1:964:5] web-frontpage users. pwd access [*"] [classification: web-appl1cation-actlv1ty] [priority: 2] \{tcp
119:10:11 (http_1nspect) SELF DIRECTORY TRAVERSAL [] \{TCP\) 180.137.148.74:51004 -> 100.1. 101. l:309/par
1:1093:8] WEB-CGI cached_feed. cg1 moreover shopping cart directory traversal [vv] [Classification: web-appl
























































































1:1629:3] other-ids secureNetPro traffic ["} [classification: bad-unknown] [priority
irslon request
[""'
1:978:7] web-iis asp contents view [**t [classification: web-appl Icatioh-attack] tpr1ority:'l] \{tcp\) 244
ro traffic [] [classification: Bad-unknown] [Pri





c] [Classification: attempted-recon] [Priority: 2] \{UDP\) 15
1 1ca 1o -a plication- t [Pri rity: 1]
\{Tcr' '
1:162 other-ids SecureNetP f1c"[] p iority: 2] \{tcp\} 182.4.110
1:6 SCAN synscan portscan **] [Classification: attempted-recon] [Priority: 2] \{tcp\> 139.127.249.56:
1:25 : DNS SPOOF query response with TTL of 1 min. and no authority [v*] [classification: bad-unknown] [P
1:1054:61 WEB-misc webloglc/tomcat . Isp view source attempt ['*] [classification: web-application-attack] [
1:1435:4] DNS named authors attempt [* 1 [Classification: attempted-recon] [priority: 2] \{TCP\) 85.222.67.
1:808:6] web-cgi webdriver access [] [classification: attempted-recon] [Priority: 2] \{TCP\) 213.5.54.19:
.119:2:1^ (http_1nspect3 double decoding attack ["] \{tcp\} 213.5.54.19:22422 -> 100.1. 101. l:108/par' :253:3'
dns spoof query response ptr with ttl of 1 min. and no authority ["*] [classification: bad-unknown'1:254:3'
DNS SPOOF query response with ttl of 1 m1n. and no authority [*] [Classification: bad-unknown] [P
'l:962:6J web-frontpage shtml.exe access [] [Classification: web-appl1cat1on-act1v1ty] [Priority: 2] MtcP
backdoor typot trojan traffic [] [classification: trolan-activlty] [Priority: 1] \{tcp\) 204.39
web-php Phorum /support/common. php attempt ["**] [classification: web-application-attack] [pMoMt
1:1269:9] RPC portmap rexd request TCP ["] [Classification: rpc-portmap-decode] [Priority: 2] \{TCP\) 87.1

















J [classification: protocol -command-decode] [Priority: 31 tcp\}
gl directory traversa I attempt L""J LC iassincation:^web-applicat1
] SMTP expn cybercop attempt [
...J icmp ping Microsoft windows u
'1:1628:5] WEB-CGI FormHandler. cgi directory traversal attempt attempt [**] [Class
'1:472:1] ICMP redirect host [*"] [Classification: bad-unknown] [priority: 2] MIC
'1:1823:3] web-cgi AlienForm af.c i l [**] [cl lficatl
ICMP [**] [classification: mlsc-actlvity] [Priority: 3] \{ICM }
'fiel icatlon: web-ap li
I MP\) 203.124. .
'1:460:4] ICMP unassigned! (Type 2) ["] [classification: m1sc-act1v1ty] [Priority: 3] \<icmp\J
'1:2153:1] web-php autohtml.php directory traversal attempt ["] [classification: web-applicat
1:2399:1] web-php WAnewsletter db_type.php access ["*] [classification: web-applicat1on-act1v p
1:893:5] WEB-CGI Machinelnfo access [""] [Classification: attempted-recon] [Priority: 2] \{TCP''
"] [Classification: web-appl i cat i -a1:2295:21 web-php Advanced Poll adm1n_sett1ngs. php access [
1:1847:3] web-misc webali2er access [*]
"
1:1629:3] other-ids SecureNetPro traffic ["] [classification
1:992:5] web-iis adctest.asp access [**] [classification: web
1:254:3. . - .. . .
'ficatlon: rpc-portmap-decode] [Priority: 2] \{TCP\}
:l]"DDOS tfn client command BE [] [classification: attempted-dos] [Priority: 2] \{ICMP\} 100.1.101.1
:7] WEB-CGI Hyperseek hsx.cgl directory traversal attempt [**] [classification: web-application-attack[..,.-.,-,_ ,*
-ation_att
bad-unknown] [Priority: 2] \{tcp\) 189.193.2.
]" "] eb-appl1cat1on-activity] [Priority: 2] \{tcp\} 1
] dns spoof query response with ttl of 1 min. and no authority [**] [classification: bad-unknown] [p
i Classifi li at**] [Classification: web-applic
il I il/,
Figure F3 - IDS Alert Files
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Appendix C: AutomaticAttack Generation Code Logic
New Graphical User Interface Documentation for Automatic Attack Generation
The interface for automatic attack generation is slightly different than the interface for
manual attack generation. This is a documentation of the interface and an explanation of the
differences between the two interfaces.




V Input scenario from file:
Format is: InputFile_<Name of Scenario
Start
Next choose "Quick and DirtyMethod'
Generation Method?
Would you like to generate attacks quick and





The screen that comes up looks like this:
Automatic Attack Generation
AutomaticAttack Generation
Scenario Name: | Test scenario
Please specify the number of
attacks to generate:
Update
Attack 1 ] Attack 2 j Attack 3 j Attack 4 j Attacks |
Target IP : Goal on Target :
? j Pilfering100.10.20.1 3
Efficiency of Hacker (0-1): .9
This is a measure of how quickly the
hacker will pentrate and achieve the
goal. A higher efficiency score with
provide more direct attacks and higher
success rates.
Stealth Level of Hacker (0-1): j -5
This is a measure of the hackers tendancy
to achieve goals on machines other than
the target. More goals will occur on other
machines besides the target with a low
stealth score,



























IP address of the machine you wish the final goal to be achieved
on.
The final goal of the hack being simulated
Measures how quickly the hackerwill penetrate the network and
achieve the goal. Also a measure ofhow successful the hacker's
actions are. Think of this as a measure of the hackers skill level.
Measures the amount of time a hacker will execute a goal when a
stepping stone machine is compromised
The time before the attack will start
The average delay time between steps of the attack
In this interface, the user will specify a scenario name, which will correspond to the text
files generated and the folder they are stored in. Then the user will input the number of attacks
they wish to create in the first text box (limit is 10 attacks). Pressing the update command button
will increase or decrease the number of pages in the multipage based on the number of attacks
entered. The user then specifies the information listed above for each attack on subsequent
pages. The user then specifies some noise information (this is the same as the manual interface)
and the time to run after the last attack completes.
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AppendixD: Verification and Validation
This section shows the variables and stations created in SIMAN, the simulation
programming language, when the user creates a simulated network in the model. Also shown are
a series of sensor configurations on a simulated network and the corresponding alert files that are
created based on the sensor configuration
Variables and Stations from Template
VARIABLES: StepsPerAttack (10) , CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None -None") :
MaxArgs , CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-None" ) , 10 :
AutoAttack, CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ("None-None") :
AttacksComplete, CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-None" ) :
NumlnSubGroup ( 5 , 7) , CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-None" ) :
AvgStepDelay(lO) , CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-None") :
AttackDelay(lO) , CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-None" ) :
AddRunTime , CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-None " ) :
StepDelay(30,10) , CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-None" ) :
AttackCompleteTime, CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-None" ) :
SnortOn, CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-None" ) , 1 :
NoiseMax, CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-None") :
Expon, CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-None" ) :
Attack (300 ,10) , CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
None") ,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,100,10,20,5,100,30,40,10,1,1,0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,
0,0,0,100,2,45,34,100,3 0,40,10,1,1,100,20,20,10,100,10,20,5,1,1,0:
Machine 1(8), CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
None") ,1,100,10,20,1,1,0,0:
Machine 2(8), CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
None") ,2,100,10,20,2,1,2,0:
Machine 3(8), CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
None") ,3,100,10,20,3,1,2,0:
Machine 4(8), CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
None") .4,100,10,20,4,0,1,0:
NumlnGroup (5) , CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-None" ) :
Machine 5(8), CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
None") ,5, 100, 10, 20, 5, 0,0,0:
Machine 6(8) , CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
None") ,6,100,10,20,6,0,0,1:
Machine 7(8), CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
None") ,7,100,10,20,7,0,0,1:
Machine 8(8), CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
None") ,8,100,10,20,8,0,0,1:
Machine 9(8), CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
None") ,9,100,10,20,9,0,0,1:
IDSExists(lO) , CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-None" ) :
NoiseFrequency, CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ("None-None") :
MaxSteps, CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-None") ,30:
SucessProbability(30,10) , CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-None") :

































, CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
1:
, CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
1:
, CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
1:
, CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
1:
, CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
1:
, CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
1:
, CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
1:
, CLEAR ( System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
1:
NoOfAttacks , CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-None" )
STATIONS :
, CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-
1:
IP ( 8 , 100) , CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-None" ) :
xx, CLEAR (System) , CATEGORY ( "None-None" ) ;
1 , Machine 1
2 , Machine 2
3 , Machine 3
4 , Machine 4
5 , Machine 5
6 , Machine 6
7 , Machine 7

























































101 , Ground Truth, , , , AUTOSTATS (Yes, , )
102 , Snort Alerts, , , , AUTOSTATS (Yes, , )
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Name Size Type Date Modified
WConfiguration 1 15 KB GIF Image 6/20/2006 1:57 PM
(|j Configuration l_DragonGroundTruth 1KB Text Document 6/21/2006 12: 19 PM
(] Configuration l_DragonHost_3 4KB Text Document 6/21/2006 12:19 PM
(y Configuration 1 1KB Text Document 6/21/2006 12: 19 PM
(|] Configuration l_HttpInspectGroundTruth 1KB Text Document 6/21/2006 12:19 PM
iJ Configuration l_SnortandHttpInspectGroundTruth 1KB Text Document 6/21/2006 12:19 PM
(sj Configuration 1 1KB Text Document 6/21/2006 12:19 PM
!l] Configuration l_SnortHost_3 5 KB Text Document 6/21/2006 12:19 PM
i|l Configuration 1 1KB Text Document 6/21/2006 12:19PM
Hj Configuration l_SnortNetwork_l 12 KB Text Document 6/21/2006 12:19 PM


































































AppendixE: ProcessRefinement Testing Setup - Random Detection Scenarios








































































































































































































Appendix F: Process Refinement Testing Setup - SingleAttack Scenarios
This section shows the inputs to the simulation methodology used to create the single
attack scenarios for testing Process Refinement. The resulting attack output from the simulation
is also shown. The screen shot below shows the input for Single Attack Scenario 1 and the table




Scenario Name: j single Attack i
Please specify the number of i




Efficiency of Hacker (0-1):
Goal on Target:
"3 r Dos 13
0.9 Stealth Level of Hacker (0-1): 0.9
This is a measure of how quickly the
hacker writ pentrate and achieve the
goal. A higher efficiency score with
provide more direct attacks and higher
success rates.
Delay This Attack By (irins):
This is a measure of the hackers tendency
to achieve goals on machines other than
the target. More goals wil occur on other




Percent of time to
encode step (0-1):
10 10
Mb: Alerts Per Hour:
| 30000
Type ofNoise: Percentage:









Simulation Inputfor Scenarios 2-5
Target Goal Efficiency Stealth Attack Delay Step Delay
Scenario 2 100.50.3.1 Pilfering 0.9 0.7 10 10
Scenario 3 100.40.3.6 Backdoor 0.8 0.7 10 10
Scenario 4 100.80.3.2 Backdoor 0.7 0.9 10 10
Scenario 5 100.60.3.4 DoS 0.7 0.7 10 10
Scenario 1 Results
Attack 1, Step 1, Recon, Footprinting, RPC AMD TCP version request, Encoded,
137.28.255.173, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 2, Escalation, OS, NETBIOS DCERPC Messenger Service buffer
overflow attempt, Encoded, 122.49.175.191, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =,
0.9, ->, FAIL
Attack 1, Step 2, Escalation, OS, NETBIOS DCERPC Messenger Service buffer
overflow attempt, Encoded, 162.182.4.110, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =,
0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 3, Escalation, OS, EXPLOIT SCO calserver overflow, Encoded,
100.10.1.2, ->, 100.40.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 4, Intrusion, Root, WEB -COLDFUSION startstop DOS access,
Encoded, 100.40.2.1, ->, 100.40.3.6, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 5, Intrusion, User, WEB-CGI rsh access, Encoded, 100.40.2.1,
>, 100.50.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 6, Misc, Other, DNS EXPLOIT x86 Linux overflow attempt,
Encoded, 100.50.3.1, ->, 100.50.4.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 7, Goal, Dos, WEB-FRONTPAGE contents.htm access, Encoded,
100.50.3.1, ->, 100.50.4.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Scenario 2 Results
Attack 1, Step 1, Recon, Enumeration, WEB-PHP myPHPNuke chatheader . php
access, Encoded, 211.151.252.233, ->, 100.10.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->,
SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 2, Escalation, Service, NETBIOS SMB Data Service Session Setup
AndX request username overflow attempt, Encoded, 104.217.211.172, ->,
100.10.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, FAIL
Attack 1, Step 2, Escalation, Service, FTP STOU overflow attempt, Encoded,
4.110.103.71, ->, 100.10.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 3, Intrusion, Root, NETBIOS SMB CD..., Encoded, 100.10.1.3, -
>, 100.40.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 4, Intrusion, User, WEB-CGI upload.pl access, Encoded,
100.10.1.3, ->, 100.40.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 5, Misc, Other, DNS EXPLOIT x86 FreeBSD overflow attempt,
Encoded, 100.40.2.1, ->, 100.50.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 6, Goal, Pilfering, BACKDOOR MISC Solaris 2.5 attempt,
Encoded, 100.40.2.1, ->, 100.50.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Scenario 3 Results
Attack 1, Step 1, Intrusion, Other, WEB-PHP viewtopic.php access, Encoded,
5.147.26.27, ->, 100.20.1.1, Prob of Success =, 0.8, ->, FAIL
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Attack 1, Step 1, Intrusion, Other, WEB-PHP PayPal Storefront arbitrary
command execution attempt, Encoded, 138.110.130.59, ->, 100.20.1.1, Prob of
Success =, 0.8, ->, FAIL
Attack 1, Step 1, Intrusion, Other, WEB-PHP viewtopic.php access, Encoded,
110.103.71.252, ->, 100.20.1.1, Prob of Success =, 0.8, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 2, Intrusion, Root, WEB-PHP Advanced Poll admin_password.php
access, Encoded, 204.178.103.5, ->, 100.20.1.1, Prob of Success =, 0.8, ->,
FAIL
Attack 1, Step 2, Intrusion, Root, WEB-PHP IdeaBox cord.php file include,
Encoded, 253.121.2.109, ->, 100.20.1.1, Prob of Success =, 0.8, ->, FAIL
Attack 1, Step 2, Intrusion, Root, WEB-CGI quickstore . cgi access, Encoded,
156.94.135.235, ->, 100.20.1.1, Prob of Success =, 0.8, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 3, Goal, Pilfering, MISC rsyncd module list access, Encoded,
207.196.236.13, ->, 100.20.1.1, Prob of Success =, 0.8, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 4, Recon, Enumeration, WEB-MISC MsmMask.exe access. Encoded,
58.130.159.155, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.8, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 5, Intrusion, Other, WEB-PHP b2 cafelog gm-2-b2.php remote
command execution attempt, Encoded, 63.51.249.46, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of
Success =, 0.8, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 6, Intrusion, Other, WEB-CLIENT readme. eml download attempt,
Encoded, 100.10.1.2, ->, 100.40.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.8, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 7, Goal, Pilfering, WEB -COLDFUSION set odbc ini attempt,
Encoded, 100.10.1.2, ->, 100.40.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.8, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 8, Goal, Pilfering, WEB-ATTACKS tftp command attempt, Encoded,
100.10.1.2, ->, 100.40.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.8, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 9, Misc, Other, DNS EXPLOIT x86 Linux overflow attempt,
100.40.2.1, ->, 100.40.3.6, Prob of Success =, 0.8, ->, FAIL
Step 9, Misc, Other, DNS EXPLOIT x86 Linux overflow attempt





Attack 1, Step 9, Misc, Other, DNS EXPLOIT x86 Linux overflow attempt
100.40.2.1, ->, 100.40.3.6, Prob of Success =, 0.8,(ADMv2) , Encoded,
SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 10, Goal, Backdoor, BACKDOOR Infector.l.x, Encoded,




Attack 1, Step 1, Misc, Other, POLICY FTP CWD / possible warez site, Encoded,
26.27.204.73, ->, 100.20.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, FAIL
Attack 1, Step 1, Misc, Other, POLICY FTP STOR 1MB possible warez site,
Encoded, 39.136.57.150, ->, 100.20.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, FAIL
Attack 1, Step 1, Misc, Other, POLICY FTP CWD / possible warez site, Encoded,
102.231.191.23, ->, 100.20.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 2, Goal, Dos, BAD-TRAFFIC IP Proto 77 (Sun ND) . Encoded,
132.247.143.232, ->, 100.20.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, FAIL
Attack 1, Step 2, Goal, Dos, POP3 UIDL negative arguement attempt, Encoded,
147.63.220.20, ->, 100.20.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 3, Escalation, OS, NETBIOS DCERPC ISystemActivator path
overflow attempt little endian, Encoded, 100.20.1.3, ->, 100.70.2.1, Prob of
Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 4, Misc, Other, MISC BGP invalid type (0), Encoded,
100.70.2.1, ->, 100.70.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 5, Recon, Scanning, BAD-TRAFFIC loopback traffic, Encoded,
100.70.2.1, ->, 100.80.3.2, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, FAIL
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Attack 1, Step 5, Recon, Scanning, BAD-TRAFFIC udp port 0 traffic, Encoded,
100.70.2.1, ->, 100.80.3.2, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 6, Intrusion, Root, TELNET APC SmartSlot default admin account
attempt, Encoded, 100.70.2.1, ->, 100.80.3.2, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->,
SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 7, Escalation, Service, NETBIOS SMB Session Setup AndX request
Unicode username overflow attempt, Encoded, 100.70.2.1, ->, 100.80.3.2, Prob
of Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 8, Intrusion, Root, NETBIOS SMB DCERPC Workstation Service
bind attempt microsof t-ds, Encoded, 100.70.2.1, ->, 100.80.3.2, Prob of
Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 9, Goal, Backdoor, BACKDOOR Doly 1.5 server response, Encoded,
100. 70. 2.1, ->, 100.80.3.2, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
Scenario 5 Results
Attack 1, Step 1, Recon, Footprinting, SCAN nmap TCP, Encoded, 53.48.149.21,
->, 100.10.1.1, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, FAIL
Attack 1, Step 1, Recon, Footprinting, RPC portmap pcnfsd request UDP,
Encoded, 42.206.52.244, ->, 100.10.1.1, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, FAIL
Attack 1, Step 1, Recon, Footprinting, RPC portmap sadmind request UDP,
Encoded, 241.31.165.89, ->, 100.10.1.1, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 2, Intrusion, Other, WEB-ATTACKS kill command attempt,
Encoded, 13.133.194.205, ->, 100.10.1.1, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, FAIL
Attack 1, Step 2, Intrusion, Other, INFO Connection Closed MSG from Port 80,
Encoded, 147.63.220.20, ->, 100.10.1.1, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 3, Intrusion, User, WEB-MISC Tomcat servlet mapping cross site
scripting attempt, Encoded, 100.10.1.1, ->, 100.60.2.1, Prob of Success =,
0.7, - > , SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 4, Escalation, Service, EXPLOIT ebola USER overflow attempt,
Encoded, 100.60.2.1, ->, 100.60.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 5, Intrusion, Other, WEB-PHP phpMyAdmin
db_details_importdocsql .php access, Encoded, 100.60.2.1, ->, 100.60.3.1, Prob
of Success =, 0.7, ->, FAIL
Attack 1, Step 5, Intrusion, Other, WEB-PHP shoutbox.php directory traversal
attempt, Encoded, 100.60.2.1, ->, 100.60.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->,
SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 6, Goal, Dos, RPC mountd UDP unmountall request, Encoded,
100.60.2.1, ->, 100.60.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 7, Goal, Backdoor, BACKDOOR MISC Linux rootkit satori attempt,
Encoded, 100.60.2.1, ->, 100.60.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 8, Misc, Other, POLICY FTP RETR 1MB possible warez site,
Encoded, 100.60.3.1, ->, 100.60.3.3, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 9, Goal, Dos, RPC mountd UDP unmountall request, Encoded,
100.60.3.3, ->, 100.60.3.4, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 10, Goal, Pilfering, ORACLE create table attempt, Encoded,
100.60.3.3, ->, 100.60.3.4, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 11, Goal, Dos, POP3 DELE negative arguement attempt, Encoded,
100.60.3.3, ->, 100.60.3.4, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 12, Misc, Other, POLICY FTP CWD possible warez site, Encoded,
100.60.3.3, ->, 100.60.3.4, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 13, Goal, Dos, RPC mountd UDP unmount request, Encoded,
100.60.3.3, ->, 100.60.3.4, Prob of Success =, 0.7, ->, SUCCESS
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Appendix G: Process Refinement Testing Setup - MultipleAttack Scenarios
This section shows the inputs to the simulation methodology used to create the multiple
attack scenarios for testing Process Refinement. The resulting attack output from the simulation
is also shown. The screen shots below shows the input for Multiple Attack Scenario 1 and the
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Simulation Inputsfor Scenarios 2-5
Target Goal Efficiency Stealth Attack Delay Step Delay
Scenario 2
Attack 1 100.40.2.1 Backdoor 0.9 0.9 10 10
Attack 2 100.20.1.1 DoS 0.9 0.9 10 15
Attack 3 100.80.3.2 DoS 0.9 0.9 10 10
Scenario 3
Attack 1 100.40.3.3 Pilfering 0.9 0.9 10 10
Attack 2 100.50.4.4 Backdoor 0.9 0.9 5 5
Attack 3 100.60.3.2 Pilfering 0.9 0.9 10 10
Scenario 4
Attack 1 100.80.3.1 DoS 0.9 0.9 10 10
Attack 2 100.50.4.6 Backdoor 0.9 0.9 5 10
Attack 3 100.60.3.4 Pilfering 0.9 0.9 5 5
Scenario 5
Attack 1 100.50.4.1 Backdoor 0.9 0.9 10 10
Attack 2 100.30.2.2 Pilfering 0.9 0.9 10 5
Attack 3 100.70.3.1 Pilfering 0.9 0.9 5 5
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Scenario I Results
Attack 3, Step 1, Recon, Footprinting, RPC portmap RQUOTA request UDP, ,
237.85.139.21, ->, 100.10.1.2, Probof Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 1, Recon, Footprinting, WEB-IIS /StoreCSVS/lnstantOrder .asmx
request, , 21.49.174.116, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, FAIL
Attack 1, Step 1, Recon, Footprinting, OTHER-IDS ISS RealSecure 6 event
collector connection attempt, , 63.220.20.112, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of
Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 2, Escalation, OS, NETBIOS DCERPC Messenger Service buffer
overflow attempt, , 202.85.115.142, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9,
> , SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 1, Misc, Other, POLICY FTP MKD / possible warez site, ,
192.70.172.66, ->,
Attack 2, Step 2,
16.80, ->,11. 104
100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Intrusion, Other, WEB-PHP forum_details.php access, ,
100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 3, Escalation, Service, WEB -COLDFUSION expeval access, ,
100.10.1.2, ->, 100.40.2.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 4, Intrusion, Root, WEB -COLDFUSION cfmlsyntaxcheck . cfm access,
, 100.40.2.2, ->, 100.50.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 3, Escalation, OS, EXPLOIT SCO calserver overflow, ,
100.10.1.2, ->, 100.40.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 2, Intrusion, User, WEB-IIS as_web4.exe access, ,
120.191.192.102, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 5, Intrusion, Other, WEB-IIS ASP contents view, , 100.40.2.2,
->, 100.50.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 3, Escalation, OS, EXPLOIT SCO calserver overflow, ,
100.10.1.2, ->, 100.40.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 4, Intrusion, Root, MS-SQL/SMB shellcode attempt, ,
100.40.2.1, ->, 100.40.3.6, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 5, Intrusion, User, WEB-CGI upload.pl access, , 100.40.2.1, -
>, 100.50.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, FAIL
1, Step 5, Intrusion, User, WEB-CGI ksh access, , 100.40.2.1, ->,
1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, FAIL
Step 4, Intrusion, Root, WEB -COLDFUSION exampleapp access, ,
1, ->, 100.50.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Step 5, Intrusion, User, WEB-CGI LWGate access, , 100.40.2.1, ->,
1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Step 6, Misc, Other, DNS EXPLOIT x86 Linux overflow attempt
, 100.50.3.1, ->, 100.50.4.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Step 5, Intrusion, Other, INFO FTP no password, , 100.50.3.1, ->,
100.50.4.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 6, Intrusion, Root, MS-SQL/SMB sp_password password change, ,
100.50.3.1, ->, 100.50.4.5, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 6, Misc, Other, DNS EXPLOIT x86 Linux overflow attempt, ,
100.50.3.1, ->, 100.50.4.4, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 7, Goal, Pilfering, POLICY FTP anonymous login attempt, ,
100.50.3.1, ->, 100.50.4.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 7, Goal, Backdoor, BACKDOOR Doly 2.0 access, , 100.50.3.1, ->,
100.50.4.5, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 7, Escalation, OS, EXPLOIT nips x86 Solaris overflow, ,
100.50.4.4, ->, 100.50.4.6, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 8, Escalation, Service, SMTP RCPT TO overflow, , 100.50.4.4,
>, 100.50.4.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 9, Goal, Dos, WEB-FRONTPAGE dvwssr.dll access, , 100.50.4.4,












Attack 3, Step 1, Recon, Footprinting, RPC portmap nlockmgr request TCP, ,
6.139.234.110, ->, 100.20.1.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 1, Intrusion, Other, WEB-PHP forumdetails .php access, ,
149.21.117.231, ->, 100.20.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 2, Escalation, Service, NETBIOS SMB Data Service Session Setup
AndX request username overflow attempt, , 110.130.59.158, ->, 100.20.1.1,
Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 1, Misc, Other, WEB -CLIENT Javascript URL host spoofing
attempt, Encoded, 162.161.110.25, ->, 100.20.1.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->,
SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 3, Intrusion, Root, IMAP auth overflow attempt, , 100.20.1.1,
->, 100.70.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 4, Intrusion, Other, WEB-CLIENT RealPlayer arbitrary
javascript command attempt, , 100.20.1.1, ->, 100.70.2.1, Prob of Success =,
0.9, - > , SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 5, Escalation, Service, EXPLOIT ISAKMP forth payload
certificate request length overflow attempt, , 100.70.2.1, ->, 100.80.3.2,
Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 6, Intrusion, Other, WEB-PHP gallery arbitrary command
execution attempt, , 100.70.2.1, ->, 100.80.3.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->,
SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 2, Intrusion, Root, WEB-PHP read_body . php access attempt, ,
17.16.203.97, ->, 100.20.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 2, Intrusion, Root, WEB-PHP rolis guestbook arbitrary command
execution attempt, Encoded, 231.147.63.220, ->, 100.20.1.1, Prob of Success
=, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 7, Goal, Dos, NETBIOS SMB DCE/RPC NTLMSSP invalid mechlistMIC
attempt, , 100.70.2.1, ->, 100.80.3.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 3, Goal, Dos, WEB-CLIENT Microsoft wmf metafile access,
Encoded, 19.149.130.203, ->, 100.20.1.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, FAIL
Attack 2, Step 3, Goal, Dos, EXPLOIT ICQ SRV_MULTl/SRV_META_USER email
overflow attempt, Encoded, 21.87.62.112, ->, 100.20.1.1, Prob of Success =,
0.9, - > , FAIL
Attack 2, Step 3, Goal, Dos, WEB-MISC negative Content -Length attempt,
Encoded, 116.151.19.30, ->, 100.20.1.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 3, Misc, Other, POLICY FTP MKD possible warez site, ,
27.160.20.159, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 4, Intrusion, Root, RPC portmap proxy integer overflow attempt
UDP, , 44.167.1.193, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 5, Misc, Other, DNS EXPLOIT x86 Linux overflow attempt, ,
100.10.1.2, ->, 100.40.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 6, Goal, Backdoor, BACKDOOR SatansBackdoor .2 . 0 .Beta, ,
100.10.1.2, ->, 100.40.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Scenario 3 Results
Attack 2, Step 1, Misc, Other, POLICY FTP MKD / possible warez site, ,
136.23.194.103, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 1, Intrusion, Other, WEB-PHP b2 cafelog gm-2-b2.php remote
command execution attempt, , 70.172.66.23, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =,
0.9, ->, FAIL
Attack 1, Step 1, Recon, Enumeration, WEB-CGI fileseek.cgi access, ,
27.85.33.1, ->, 100.10.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
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Intrusion, Root, MS-SQL/SMB xp_enumresultset possible
100.40.2.2, ->, 100.50.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->,
Attack 3, Step 1, Intrusion, Other, WEB-PHP b2 cafelog gm-2-b2.php remote
command execution attempt, , 61.224.156.96, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success
=, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 2, Escalation, Service, NETBIOS SMB Data Service Session Setup
AndX request username overflow attempt, , 67.67.46.89, ->, 100.10.1.3, Prob
of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 2, Intrusion, Other, WEB-PHP forum_details .php access, ,
4.110.103.71, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 3, Escalation, Service, MS-SQL xp_proxiedmetadata possible
buffer overflow, , 100.10.1.2, ->, 100.40.2.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->,
SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 4,
buffer overflow,
SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 3, Intrusion, Root, MS-SQL/SMB xp_reg* registry access, ,
100.10.1.3, ->, 100.40.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 5, Intrusion, Other, SHELLCODE x86 stealth NOOP, , 100.40.2.2,
Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Intrusion, User, WEB-IIS Unicode directory traversal
.1.3, ->, 100.40.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Misc, Other, DNS EXPLOIT x86 Linux overflow attempt
.2.1, ->, 100.40.3.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Escalation, Service, FTP CEL overflow attempt, ,
100.50.4.4, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 7, Intrusion, Other, FINGER remote command pipe execution
attempt, , 100.50.3.1, ->, 100.50.4.4, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Step 8, Goal, Dos, WEB-FRONTPAGE dvwssr.dll access, , 100.50.3.1, -
.4.4, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Step 2, Escalation, OS, NETBIOS DCERPC Messenger Service buffer
121.2.109.74, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->,
->, 100.50.3.1,
Attack 1, Step 4,
attempt, , 100.10
Attack 1, Step 5,
(ADMv2), , 100.40







Attack 2, Step 9, Goal, Backdoor, BACKDOOR QAZ Worm Client Login access, ,
100.50.3.1, ->, 100.50.4.4, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 6, Goal, Pilfering, FTP RNFR ././ attempt, , 100.40.2.1, ->,
100.40.3.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 3, Intrusion, Root, WEB-PHP read_body . php access attempt, ,
100.10.1.2, ->, 100.60.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 4, Intrusion, Other, WEB-PHP phpMyAdmin
dbdetailsimportdocsql.php access, , 100.60.2.1, ->, 100.60.3.1, Prob of
Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 5, Misc, Other, POLICY FTP RETR 1MB possible warez site, ,
100.60.2.1, ->, 100.60.3.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 6, Escalation, OS, NETBIOS SMB DCERPC Remote Activation bind
attempt, , 100.60.3.3, ->, 100.60.3.4, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 7, Escalation, Service, WEB-MISC changepw.exe access, ,
100.60.3.3, ->, 100.60.3.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 8, Goal, Pilfering, ORACLE create table attempt, , 100.60.3.3,
->, 100.60.3.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, FAIL
Attack 3, Step 8, Goal, Pilfering, ORACLE sys.all_users access,
->, 100.60.3.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
100.60.3.3,
Scenario 4 Results
Attack 3, Step 1, Intrusion, Other, WEB-PHP forum_details.php access,
237.85.139.21, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
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Attack 2, Step 1, Misc, Other, POLICY FTP MKD / possible warez site, ,
192.70.172.66, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 1, Recon, Enumeration, FTP LIST directory traversal attempt,
27.85.33.1, ->, 100.20.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 2, Escalation, Service, WEB-MISC cwmail.exe access, ,
, 100.20.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Escalation, OS, NETBIOS DCERPC Messenger Service buffer
, 120.191.192.102, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9,
56.114.61.224, ->
Attack 3, Step 2,
overflow attempt,
->, SUCCESS










Intrusion, Root, WEB-MISC oracle portal demo access, ,
100.60.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 2, Intrusion, Other, WEB-PHP forum_details .php access, ,
129.36.132.247, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 4, Intrusion, Other, WEB-PHP shoutbox.php directory traversal
attempt, , 100.60.2.1, ->, 100.60.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 3, Escalation, Service, MS-SQL xp_proxiedmetadata possible
buffer overflow, , 100.10.1.2, ->, 100.40.2.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->,
FAIL
Attack 3, Step 5, Misc, Other, POLICY FTP CWD possible warez site, ,
100.60.2.1, ->, 100.60.3.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Step 6, Escalation, OS, NETBIOS SMB DCERPC Remote Activation bind
, 100.60.3.3, ->, 100.60.3.4, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, FAIL
Step 3, Escalation, Service, RPC snmpXdmi overflow attempt TCP, ,
2, ->, 100.40.2.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, FAIL
Step 3, Escalation, Service, EXPLOIT x86 Linux mountd overflow, ,
2, ->, 100.40.2.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 4, Intrusion, Root, FTP SITE EXEC attempt, , 100.40.2.2,
100.50.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 5, Intrusion, Other, WEB-IIS ASP contents view,
->, 100.50.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 6, Escalation, OS, NETBIOS SMB DCERPC Remote Activation bind
attempt, , 100.60.3.3, ->, 100.60.3.4, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 6, Escalation, Service, POP3 EXPLOIT x86 BSD overflow, ,
100.50.3.1, ->, 100.50.4.6, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 7, Escalation, Service, SMTP MAIL FROM sendmail prescan too
many addresses overflow, , 100.60.3.3, ->, 100.60.3.4, Prob of Success =,
0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 8, Goal, Pilfering, ORACLE create table attempt, , 100.60.3.3,
->, 100.60.3.4, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 7, Intrusion, Other, INFO FTP no password, , 100.50.3.1, ->,
100.50.4.6, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, FAIL
Attack 1, Step 3, Intrusion, Root, WEB-PHP rolis guestbook arbitrary command
execution attempt, , 100.20.1.3, ->, 100.70.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->,
SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 7, Intrusion, Other, WEB-CGI SWSoft ASPSeek Overflow attempt,
, 100.50.3.1, ->, 100.50.4.6, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, FAIL
Attack 2, Step 7, Intrusion, Other, WEB-CLIENT readme. eml autoload attempt, ,
100.50.3.1, ->, 100.50.4.6, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, FAIL
Attack 2, Step 7, Intrusion, Other, SHELLCODE x86 NOOP, , 100.50.3.1, ->,
100.50.4.6, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 8, Goal, Dos, ICMP Large ICMP Packet, , 100.50.3.1, ->,
100.50.4.6, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 9, Goal, Backdoor, BACKDOOR Infector.l.x, , 100.50.3.1, ->,
100.50.4.6, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 4, Intrusion, User, ; flow:to_server established; uricontent:,
, 100.20.1.3, ->, 100.70.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
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Attack 1, Step 5, Misc, Other, WEB-MISC nc.exe attempt,
100.80.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 6, Goal, Dos, SMTP XEXCH50 overflow attempt,









Attack 3, Step 1, Recon, Footprinting, WEB-CGI quickstore.cgi access, ,
85.139.21.162, ->, 100.20.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 1, Recon, Footprinting, WEB-IIS /StoreCSVS/lnstantOrder .asmx
request, , 200.118.193.153, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, FAIL
Attack 2, Step 1, Recon, Enumeration, WEB-CGI fileseek.cgi access, ,
192.70.172.66, ->, 100.10.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 1, Recon, Footprinting, RPC portmap rwalld request TCP. ,
100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Intrusion, User, WEB-CGI simplestmail .cgi access, ,
100.10.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, FAIL
Step 2, Escalation, Service, NNTP ihave overflow attempt, ,
.162, ->, 100.20.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 2, Intrusion, User, WEB-MISC VsSetCookie.exe access, ,
205.144.52.53, ->, 100.10.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 3, Intrusion, Other, WEB-PHP PayPal Storefront arbitrary
command execution attempt, , 100.20.1.2, ->, 100.20.1.1, Prob of Success =,
0.9, - > , SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 4, Misc, Other, POLICY poll.gotomypc.com access, , 100.20.1.2,
->, 100.70.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 5, Escalation, OS, NETBIOS SMB DCERPC Messenger Service buffer
overflow attempt, , 100.70.2.1, ->, 100.80.3.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->,
SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 3, Recon, Enumeration, WEB-IIS fpcount access, ,
100.10.1.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Intrusion, User, WEB-IIS Unicode directory traversal
attempt, , 26.14.140.245, ->, 100.10.1.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, FAIL
Attack 2, Step 4, Intrusion, User, WEB-IIS achg.htr access, , 16.215.16.39, -
>, 100.10.1.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 6, Misc, Other, POLICY vncviewer Java applet download attempt,
, 100.70.2.1, ->, 100.80.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 5, Intrusion, Root, MS-SQL/SMB xpshowcolv possible buffer
overflow, , 100.10.1.1, ->, 100.30.2.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 2, Escalation, OS, NETBIOS DCERPC Messenger Service buffer
overflow attempt, , 29.167.230.60, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9,
> , SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 7, Intrusion, User, WEB-CGI story.pl arbitrary file read
attempt, , 100.70.2.1, ->, 100.70.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 3, Escalation, OS, EXPLOIT SCO calserver overflow, ,
100.10.1.2, ->, 100.40.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 4, Intrusion, Root, MS-SQL/SMB xp_displayparamstmt possible
buffer overflow, , 100.40.2.1, ->, 100.40.3.6, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->,
FAIL
Attack 1, Step 4, Intrusion, Root, MISC Insecure TIMBUKTU Password, ,
100.40.2.1, ->, 100.40.3.6, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 6, Goal, Pilfering, FTP RNFR ././ attempt, , 100.10.1.1, ->,
100.30.2.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 5, Intrusion, User, NETBIOS SMB C$ access, , 100.40.2.1, ->,
100.50.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
251.80.62.225, ->,
Attack 2 , Step 4 ,
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Attack 3, Step 8, Escalation, Service, WEB-CGI MDaemon form2raw.cgi access,
100. 70. 2.1, ->, 100.70.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 9, Goal, Pilfering, MISC rsyncd overflow attempt, ,
100.70.2.1, ->, 100.70.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 6, Misc, Other, DNS EXPLOIT x86 Linux overflow attempt, ,
100.50.3.1, ->, 100.50.4.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 7, Goal, Backdoor, BACKDOOR QAZ Worm Client Login access, ,
100.50.3.1, ->, 100.50.4.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
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AppendixH: Single Attack - ProcessRefinementRecommendations
The following tables show the Process Refinement recommendations from the Process
Refinement model during different stages of the attack. The tables are labeled such that the first
number represents the attack scenario and the second number represents the step at which the
recommendation occurs. For example, the table A1,1 shows the recommendation obtained
during attack scenario 1 at attack step 1 . A one in the table indicates that the information was
obtained and a blank indicates that the information was not obtained.
^0,0 A1,1
r
M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25 1 13 25
2 14 26 2 14 26
3 15 27 3 15 27
4 16 28 4 16 28
5 17 29 5 17 29
6 18 30 6 18 30
7 19 31 7 19 31
8 20 32 8 20 32
9 21 33 9 21 33
10 22 10 22





M SI S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M SI S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25 1 13 25
2 14 26 2 14 26
3 15 1 1 27 3 15 1 27
4 16 28 4 16 1 28
5 17 29 5 17 1 29
6 18 30 6 18 1 30
7 19 31 7 19 1 31
8 20 32 8 20 1 32
9 21 33 9 21 1 33
10 22 10 22 1






M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25 1 1
2 14 26 1 1
3 15 27 1 1
4 16 28 1 1
5 17 29
6 18 30
7 1 19 31
8 20 32
9 1 1 21 33


















M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25
2 14 26
3 15 1 1 27
4 16 1 1 28
5 17 1 1 29
6 18 1 1 30
7 19 1 1 31
L8 20 1 1 32
9 21 1 1 33





M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25
2 14 26











































































M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25 1 13 25
2 14 26 2 14 26
3 15 27 3 15 1 1 27
4 16 28 4 16 28
5 17 29 1 1 5 17 29 1 1
6 18 30 6 18 30
7 19 31 7 19 31
8 20 32 8 20 32
9 21 33 9 21 33
10 22 .. 10 22
11 23 11 23
12 24 : 12 24 ''i
A3.6
M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 1 1 13 25
2 1 1 14 26
3 1 1 15 1 1 27
4 16 1 1 28
5 1 17 1 1 29 1 1
6 18 1 1 30
7 1 1 19 1 1 31
8 1 1 20 1 1 32
9 1 1 21 1 1 33









































5 17 29 1
6 18 30 1
7 19 31 1
8 20 32 1
9 21 33 1
10 22
11 23
12 24 '<m I
A5,1
















M SI S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25
2 14 26











M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 1 1 25
2 14 1 1 26











Appendix I:Multiple Attack - Process Refinement Recommendations
The following tables show the Process Refinement recommendations from the Process
Refinement model during different stages of the attack. The tables are labeled such that the first
number represents the attack scenario and the second number represents the point at which the
recommendation occurred. For example, the table Ml,l shows the recommendation obtained
during attack scenario 1 at the first action that occurred. The table Ml,6 shows the
recommendation for attack scenario 1 after the sixth action in time has taken place. A one in the
table indicates that the information was obtained and a blank indicates that the information was
not obtained.
MO.O M1.1
M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25 1 13 25
2 14 26 2 14 26
3 15 27 3 15 27
4 16 28 4 16 28
5 17 29 5 17 29
6 18 30 6 18 30
7 19 31 7 19 31
8 20 32 8 20 32
9 21 33 9 21 33
10 22 10 22 .
11 23 11 23
12 24 12 24
M1.3
M S1 S2 M SI S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25
2 14 26











M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 1 13 25
2 1 14 26
3 1 15 27
4 16 28
5 17 29
6 1 18 30
7 1 19 31
8 1 20 32






M S1 S2 M SI S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25 1 1
2 14 26 1 1
3 15 27 1 1
4 16 28 1 1
5 17 29
6 18 30
7 1 19 31
8 20 32
9 1 1 21 33





M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M SI S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25 1 13 25
2 14 26 2 14 26
3 15 27 3 15 27
4 16 28 4 16 28
5 17 29 5 17 29 1 1
6 18 30 6 18 30
7 19 31 7 19 31
8 20 32 8 20 32
9 21 33 9 21 33
10 22 10 22
11 23 11 23
12 24 L^ ...a 12 24
M2.5 M2.13
M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25 1 13 25
2 14 26 2 14 26
3 15 27 3 15 27
4 16 28 4 16 28
5 17 29 5 17 29
6 18 30 6 18 30
7 19 31 7 19 31
8 20 32 8 20 32
9 21 33 9 21 33
10 22 10 22
11 23 11 23
12 24 12 24 )
M2.14 M2.15
M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M SI S2
1 13 25 1 13 25
2 14 26 2 14 26
3 15 1 1 27 3 15 27
4 16 28 4 16 28
5 17 29 5 17 29
6 18 30 6 18 30
7 19 31 7 1 1 19 31
8 20 32 8 1 20 32
9 21 33 9 1 1 21 33
10 22 10 1 1 22
11 23 11 23
12 24 > a 12 24
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M3,1 M3,4
M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M SI S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25 1 13 25
2 14 26 2 14 26
3 15 27 3 15 1 1 27
4 16 28 4 16 28
5 17 29 5 17 29
6 18 30 6 18 30
7 19 31 7 19 31
8 20 32 8 20 32
9 21 33 9 21 33
10 22 10 22
11 23 11 23
12 24 12 24
M3.6 M3,7
M SI S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 1 13 25 1 13 25 1 1
2 1 14 26 2 14 26 1 1
3 1 15 27 3 15 27 1 1
4 16 28 4 16 28 1 1
5 17 29 5 17 29
6 1 18 30 6 18 30
7 1 19 31 7 1 19 31
8 1 20 32 8 20 32
9 1 21 33 9 1 1 21 33
10 1 22 10 1 1 22
11 23 11 23
12 24
, , . ,
12 24
M3.18
M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 1 25 1 1
2 14 1 26 1 1
3 15 1 27 1 1
4 16 1 28 1 1
5 17 1 29
6 18 1 30
7 19 31
8 20 32
9 1 1 21 33
10 1 1 22 1 1
11 1 1 23 1 1
12 1 1 24 1 1 :
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M4.1 M4.3
M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M SI S2 M SI S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25 1 13 25
2 14 26 2 14 26
3 15 27 3 15 27
4 16 28 4 16 28
5 17 29 5 17 29
6 18 30 6 18 30
7 19 31 7 19 31
8 20 32 8 20 32
9 21 33 9 21 33
10 22 10 22
11 23 , 11 23
12 24 12 24
M4.4 M4.5
M SI S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25 1 13 25
2 14 26 2 14 26
3 15 27 3 15 1 1 27
4 16 28 4 16 28
5 17 29 1 1 5 17 29 L 1 1
6 18 30 6 18 30
7 19 31 7 19 31
8 20 32 8 20 32
9 21 33 9 21 33
10 22 10 22





M SI S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 1 1 25
2 14 1 1 26
3 15 1 1 27
4 16 28














5 17 29 1 1
6 18 30
7 1 19 31
8 20 32






M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 1 25
2 14 1 26
3 15 1 27





9 1 1 21 33
10 1 1 22 1 1 !
11 1 1 23 1 1






























M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M SI S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25 1 13 25
2 14 26 2 14 26
3 15 27 3 15 27
4 16 28 4 16 28
5 17 29 5 17 29
6 18 30 6 18 30
7 19 31 7 19 31
8 20 32 8 20 32
9 21 33 9 21 33
10 22 10 22
11 23 11 23
12 24 12 24
M5.4 M5.5
M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M SI S2 M S1 S2 M SI S2
1 13 25 1 13 25
2 14 26 2 14 26
3 15 1 1 27 3 15 1 1 27
4 16 28 4 16 28
5 17 29 5 17 29 1 1
6 18 30 6 18 30
7 19 31 7 19 31
8 20 32 8 20 32







12 24 12 24
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M5,7 M5,15
M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M SI S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25 1 13 25
2 14 26 2 14 26
3 15 1 1 27 3 15 27
4 16 28 4 16 28
5 17 29 5 17 29
6 18 30 6 18 30
7 19 31 7 1 1 19 31
8 20 32 8 1 20 32
9 21 33 9 1 1 21 33
10 22 10 1 1 22





M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M SI S2
1 13 25 1 1
2 14 26 1 1
3 15 1 1 27 1 1
4 16 28 1 1
5 17 29 1 1
6 18 1 30
7 19 31
8 20 1 32 1 1
9 1 1 21 1 33 1 1




Appendix J: Process Refinement Failure
This section shows the simulation inputs for creating the three attacks that highlight
Process Refinement's weakness. The results from running the simulation under the parameters
shown are also shown. The recommendations made by Process Refinement for this scenario are
also shown.
Attack Scenario Inputs
1 Automatic Attack Generation
AutomaticAttack Generation
Scenario Name: 1 Process Refinement Failure
attacks to generate: 1 3
Attack 1 JAttack2 | Attack3 j
Target IP: Goal on Target:
1 100.40.3.6 J | Pilfering J
Efficiency of Hacker (0-1): | -9 Stea*h Level of Hacker (0-1): | 9
This Is a measure of how quickly the This is a measure of the hackers tendancy
hacker wit pentrate and achieve the to achieve goals on machines other than
goal. A higher efficiency scorewth the target. More goalswi occur on other
provide more drect attacks and higher machines besides the target with a low
success rates. stealth score.
Delay This AttackBy (mins): Average Delay Time Percent of tme to
i Between Steps: encode step (0-1):
|. ;. |o
Noise: Alerts Per Hour:
\ 1000
Type ofNoise: Percentage: Time to Run After Last
Attack is Complete:
,








Attack 1 Attack 2 | Attack 3 |
Target IP: Goal on Target:
~3 Dos H
Efficiency of Hacker (0-1): | .9
This Is ameasure of how quickly the
hacker will pentrate and achieve the
goal. A higher efficiency score with
provide more direct attacks and higher
success rates.
Delay This Attack By (mins);
Stealth Level of Hacker (0-1); j 09
TNs Is a measure of the hackers tendancy
to achieve goals on machines other than
the target. More goals will occur on other




Percent of time to
encode step (0-1):
Attack 1 j Attack 2 Attack 3
Target IP: Goal on Target;
j 100.80.3.2 t| Backdoor *\
Efficiency of Hacker (0-1): j '9
TNs is a measure of how quickly the
hacker will pentrate and achieve the
goal. A higher efficiency score with
provide more direct attacks and higher
success rates.
Delay This Attack By (mins): Aver
Betw
Steafth Level of Hacker (0-1): | 09
This is a measure of the hackers tendancy
to achieve goals on machines other than
the target. More goalswi occur on other
machines besides the target with a low
stealth score.
sge Delay Time Percent of time to
sen Steps: encode step (0-1):
5 1 01 12 1
Simulation Results
Attack 1, Step 1, Recon, Enumeration, WEB-CGI fileseek.cgi access, ,
121.66.161.139, ->, 100.10.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 1, Misc, Other, POLICY FTP MKD / possible warez site, ,
136.23.194.103, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 2, Intrusion, Other, WEB-PHP ttCMS header. php remote command
execution attempt, , 71.107.120.17, ->, 100.10.1.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9,
> , SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 3, Escalation, Service, WEB-FRONTPAGE dvwssr.dll access, ,
100.10.1.2, ->, 100.40.2.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
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Attack 2, Step 4,
buffer overflow,
SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 2,
50.198.18.64, ->,
Attack 2, Step 5,
- >
Intrusion, Root, MS-SQL/SMB xp_setsqlsecurity possible
100.40.2.2, ->, 100.50.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->,
(ADMv2), , 100.40
Attack 2, Step 7,
Escalation, Service, NNTP sendsys overflow attempt, ,
100.10.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Intrusion, Other, WEB-IIS ASP contents view, , 100.40.2.2,
100.50.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, FAIL
Attack 1, Step 3, Intrusion, Root, WEB-FRONTPAGE orders.txt access, ,
100.10.1.3, ->, 100.40.2.1, Prob Of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 5, Intrusion, Other, SHELLCODE x86 stealth NOOP, , 100.40.2.2,
->, 100.50.3.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 6, Escalation, Service, SMTP RCPT TO overflow, , 100.50.3.1, -
>, 100.50.4.5, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 4, Intrusion, User, WEB-CGI redirect access, , 100.10.1.3, ->,
100.40.2.1, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 5, Misc, Other, DNS EXPLOIT x86 Linux overflow attempt
2.1, ->, 100.40.3.6, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Intrusion, Other, FINGER remote command pipe execution
attempt, , 100.50.3.1, ->, 100.50.4.5, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 1, Step 6, Goal, Pilfering, POLICY FTP anonymous (ftp) login attempt,
, 100.40.2.1, ->, 100.40.3.6, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 1, Recon, Enumeration, WEB-PHP phpbb quick-reply .php access, ,
70.172.66.23, ->, 100.20.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 8, Goal, Dos, DDOS mstream agent to handler, , 100.50.3.1, ->,
100.50.4.5, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, FAIL
Attack 3, Step 2, Intrusion, User, WEB-IIS as_web4.exe access, ,
160.244.138.131, ->, 100.20.1.3, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 8, Goal, Dos, DDOS TFN client command LE, , 100.50.3.1, ->,
100.50.4.5, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 2, Step 9, Goal, Dos, DOS ath, , 100.50.3.1, ->, 100.50.4.5, Prob of
Success =, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 3, Escalation, OS, NETBIOS DCERPC ISystemActivator path
overflow attempt little endian, , 100.20.1.3, ->, 100.70.2.1, Prob of Success
=, 0.9, ->, SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 4, Escalation, OS, NETBIOS SMB DCERPC Messenger Service buffer
overflow attempt, , 100.70.2.1, ->, 100.80.3.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->,
SUCCESS
Attack 3, Step 5, Goal, Backdoor, BACKDOOR DeepThroat 3.1 Connection attempt
[4120], , 100.70.2.1, ->, 100.80.3.2, Prob of Success =, 0.9, ->, FAIL
Attack 3, Step 5, Goal, Backdoor, BACKDOOR FsSniffer connection attempt, ,




M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25 1 13 25
2 14 26 2 14 26
3 15 27 3 15 27
4 16 28 4 16 28
5 17 29 5 17 29
6 18 30 6 18 30
7 19 31 7 19 31
8 20 32 8 20 32
9 21 33 9 21 33
10 22 10 22
11 23 11 23
12 24 12 24 .
F3 F4
M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25 1 1 13 25
2 14 26 2 1 14 26
3 15 1 1 27 3 1 15 27
4 16 28 4 16 28
5 17 29 5 17 29
6 18 30 6 1 18 30
7 19 31 7 1 19 31
8 20 32 8 1 20 32
9 21 33 9 1 21 33
10 22 10 1 22
11 23 11 23
12 24
, , , i 12 24
F5
M S1 S2 M S1 S2 M S1 S2
1 13 25 1 1
2 14 26 1 1
3 1 15 27 1 1





9 1 1 21 33
10 1 1 22
11 23
12 24
. i ... , . .',
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AppendixK - Simulation andProcess Refinement Files Stored on CD
This section contains a CD with files for the simulation methodology and the Process
Refinement model. The files on the CD are described below.
Cyber Attack SimulationMethodology Files:
Folder Entitled "Cyber Attack Simulation"
o Cyber Attack Simulation model file without network setup (Cyber Attack
Simulation.doe)
Can be used to create a simulated network and run attacks
o Cyber Attack Simulation input files (ListOfActions.txt; SnortAlertDefs.txt;
DragonAlertDefs.txt; SnortPriorityDefs.txt; HTTPInspectDefs.txt;
ActionsInStages.txt; GuidanceTemplate.txt)
Used to setup the attack actions possible, alert definitions, and automatic
attack generation necessary inputs
o Network Simulation template development file (Network Simulation.tpl)
Used to make edits, additions, or deletions from the Network Simulation
template
o Network Simulation template execution file (Network Simulation.tpo)
Used to open the Network Simulation template in the Arena software
Folder Entitled "Example"
o Cyber Attack Simulationmodel file with a sample network created (Cyber Attack
Simulation Example.doe)
Can be used to run attack scenarios
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o Cyber Attack Simulation input files (ListOfActions.txt; SnortAlertDefs.txt;
DragonAlertDefs.txt; SnortPriorityDefs.txt; HTTPInspectDefs.txt;
ActionsInStages.txt; GuidanceTemplate.txt)
o Network Simulation template development file (Network Simulation.tpl)
o Network Simulation template execution file (Network Simulation.tpo)
o Example Attack Scenario Input File (InputFileAttack Example.txt)
Can be used to load a previously generated attack scenario
Process Refinement Files:
Folder Entitled "Process Refinement"
o Process Refinement OPL project file (Process Refinement Project.prj)
Used to load model files and data files in OPL
o Process Refinement OPL model file (Process Refinement.mod)
Base optimization model that can have data inputs
Folder Entitled "Example"
o Process Refinement OPL project file (Process Refinement Project.prj)
o Process Refinement OPL model file (Process Refinement.mod)
o Process Refinement OPL data file with variable input blank (No Variable
Input.dat)
A data file that can be used with the Process Refinement OPL model but
needs to have the variable input information specified
o Process Refinement OPL data file with variable input specified for an example
(Variable Input Specified.dat)
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A data file that can be used with the Process Refinement OPL model to
obtain a recommendation
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